Crappy Town

Western Press: A False Friend to Russia's People Power

2012-02-12T18:50:00.000+01:00

What a difference 19 years or so makes. Western press's coverage of the recent anti-government rallies in Moscow has been extensive and hugely positive. News piece after news piece put the rally's organizers' attendance estimate in the headline, pointed out that participants braved extreme weather to attend and humanized them by reporting on their white ribbon symbol, their chants, placards, their demands and backgrounds. Many also generously labeled the protests "the largest since the collapse of the Soviet Union".

Compare this to the Western media's treatment of Russia's other massive demonstrations since the collapse of the Soviet Union — the 1993 rallies in support of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation. When Boris Yeltsin initiated his presidential coup against the Supreme Soviet tens of thousands of citizens turned to streets in revolt. Yeltsin responded by ordering force, but protesters stood their ground. Instead in most places it was Yeltsin's police that gave ground. Before long a mass of fifty to one hundred thousand people enraged by attempted violent suppression was seemingly unstoppably conquering Moscow's streets as initially combative police essentially hid. Their fortunes changed, however, when they failed to overcome live fire to take over Ostankino state television center and when Yeltsin rallied the military on his side, and armor and special forces units joined the bloody crack down.

Western governments backed Yeltsin through the putsch to the hilt, and the Western press followed their lead. According to them Yeltsin throwing the last pretense of the rule of law to the wind to dissolve the parliament, which the Constitution and the Constitutional Court were explicit he could not do and remain the president, was a "bold gamble" against "obstructionist" legislature, a part of "his attempts to break Russia out of its history of authoritarian rule". To hear them tell it what happened next was essentially that "pro-Communist demonstrators" — an instantaneously disqualifying characterization, particularly in 1993 — went on a "rampage in Moscow" in support of "rebel legislators" engaged in an attempted "coup" which if successful would have resulted in "turning the clock back on Russia's uncertain march toward democracy".

Western anglophone media could not have been less charitable to the Moscow protesters. The most hostile reporters and columnists spoke of a "Moscow mob directed by Russian totalitarianism's last-gasp fanatics", of "the rag-tag Communist rabble supporting the parliament", of "Rutskoi's ragtag army of Communists, neo-Nazis and just plain hooligans dedicated to restoring the old Soviet Union", of an "unruly band of malcontents - ranging from anti-Semitic fascists and nationalists to fervent monarchists and hard-line Stalinists", or of "neo-fascists, Stalinists, priests, and Cossacks crying out in unison". Contempt for Russians who had turned to street demonstrations was palpable.

The spotlight was firmly kept on the more ideological participants particularly the most extreme ones, and away from the majority of people on the streets who were not ideologically committed. Much was made of the fact the protesters could be of very different political persuasions. This was important to reporters not because it showed Yeltsin's policies were unpopular across the political spectrum, but because it indicated protesters opposed Yeltsin for different reasons. The size of the protest was low-balled. Where non-Western reporters' estimates went up to 150,000 their Western colleagues found only "a few thousand", "10,000" or at most "15,000" protesters.

Furthermore while their news pieces mentioned that many people were killed in the event (usually transmitting only the government's casualty figure), they never deigned to point out the casualties were overwhelmingly among the protesters. In their reports government forces never opened fire on demonstrators, gunfire simply "broke out" as rioters moved against police. Nobody was shot and killed by Yeltsin's troops, people simply "died" as protesters attacked government buildings.

This being the case the new-found appreciation of mainstream media in the US and the UK for Russian mass protest is refreshing and welcome. The Russian anti-government protesters certainly deserve to be treated fairly, but the turnaround goes to show the extent of slant and insincerity in the news served to Western audiences.

Though again people of very different ideological persuasions are marching, some of these being rather distasteful and extreme, there has been precious little howling about and contrasting of Communists and neo-Nazis, Stalinists and monarchists, priests and Cossacks that consumers of news in the West were treated to twenty years ago. Though reports pointed out the rallies (exactly as in 1993) drew large numbers of leftists and nationalist, the focus was kept on the Yeltsin-liberals though overall they probably have the least pull and mobilizing capacity of the three camps. Also rather than once again concentrate on the fact protesters oppose the government for different reason, reports pointed out opposition to Putin "brought together" people of different political options. To further improve the picture readers were reassured protests were "driven by members of the educated and urban middle class". This in contrast to 1993 "ragtag" demonstrations attended by "hooligans".

Nor is it necessary to travel back twenty years to demonstrate glaring insincerity of the Western media's new-found appreciation for Russian people power — revisiting last Saturday will do. Even as the large anti-Putin rally in downtown Moscow was being fawned over, the nature and the significance of a huge counter-rally taking place at a different Moscow location was being crudely distorted. Numerous reports brought up the "anti-Orange" counter-meeting at Moscow's Victory Park only to dismiss it as drawing "no more than 20,000 people" most of whom were allegedly state employees bused in for the occasion.

The contrast was clear; up to 120,000 "educated" and "urban" people on one side, and a punny 20,000 drones deprived of agency, simply bused in as so many sacks of potato on the other. But actually it turns out that while both demonstrations were well-attended the one in Victory Park drew more people of the two and furthermore could boast a lively atmosphere unlike the kind you would expected to see at a choreographed rally of bused-in civil servants. This is easily explained when one realizes the latter demonstration was not a pro-Putin rally, but more precisely an anti-anti-Putin rally, promoted as being a rally for Russia, against chronically malcontent pro-Western Yeltsin-liberals.

It was then a fascinating and significant people power type event, as worthy of being honestly reported on as the anti-Putin rally. But obviously this can not be expected from the same media that defended Yeltsin as "Russia's best hope for democracy" even as he staged the most serious assault on Russian democracy since the Bolsheviks shut down the Constitutional Assembly and rationalized away his violent suppression of citizen protest as him doing "what he had to do".

Croatia Did Not Vote

2012-01-24T22:20:00.000+01:00

Sunday 43.5% of eligible voters turned out for the EU membership referendum in Croatia. 66% of these voted in favor of membership. Politicians breathed a sigh of relief; the danger the referendum would fall loomed large in their mind, but this outcome did not materialize Sunday. Since November 2010, when popular opposition to EU membership briefly overtook support, there was great uneasiness among the Europeanist power elite, that was evident from the over the top and sometimes panicked way in which they conducted their pro-membership campaign.

For one thing Sunday there was no campaign silence otherwise customary for polls in Croatia, enabling the government to continue to advertise for membership into the very day of the vote and make the most of the far greater visibility of its publicly funded pro-EU campaign, compared to that of the underfunded, but spirited, grass roots anti-EU effort (operating under condition of television lockout). In an even more controversial development, a few days earlier the Minister of External and European Affairs (apparently "European affairs" are not external) warned retirees that unless Croatia joined the EU they would not receive their pensions:

"I do not want to be overly cruel, but if we do not enter the EU you will not receive your pension! I can be repugnant to you, but do not let your life to be repugnant to you. That is what it is about! We are in dire straits! Vote for the future of this country!"*

The result of the referendum indicates the aggressiveness of pro-membership campaign paid off. But how did it arrive at its success and who did it achieve victory over? The key is that as the political class demonstrated its determination to stoop to whatever depths necessary to see the absorption into the EU would not be thwarted, the voters correctly figured membership was a foregone conclusion they could do little to affect in the end. Subsequently, those undecided did not bother to look into the matter at all, and numerous opponents, as well as many supporters, did not bother to visit the poll and cast a vote according to their conviction.

The abysmally low turnout of only 43.5% indicates that government pro-EU efforts did not so much convince the many opponents of EU status to come around, as it had the effect of deterring them from taking part in the vote. In the end 56.5% of the electorate stayed at home, 14.5% came out to express their disagreement with membership, 29% their agreement. The government's pro-EU effort then was not so much carried out in the context of competition between supporters and opponents of membership, as it represented a war of the power elites against any notion of people power — a struggle the latter lost handily. This, however, represents a defeat for opponents as well as supporters of joining the EU, provided they care for prospect of real democratic decision making at all.

*The statement was given in the context of hysterical scaremongering of how voting against EU membership would mean Croatia would "lose" its credit rating "inside the week [of the vote]", which would have the effect of raising interest rates and sending the economy on a catastrophic downward spiral. It is interesting the first thought of the Minister if the country ran out of funds was for retirees who would be left without pensions rather than say, ministers who would be left without their salaries. One almost supposes the Minister assumed the funds to pay the latter would always be found, no matter how low the credit rating. It is also interesting how the politicians saddling the country with debt becomes an argument to be even more sure to let them have their way. Surely if one's main concern is the debt crisis it is only sensible to attempt to frustrate the plans of the buffoons responsible for it instead?

Croatia: Popular Sanction EU Style

2012-01-18T10:22:00.001+01:00

Croatia is not, and will not be a member of the European Union until at least July 2013, but that has not stopped it from adopting the worst practices of the EU already. Next Sunday its citizens will vote whether to join the EU, and do so under the understanding that should they pick the wrong option, they will have to vote again.

The referendum scheduled for 22nd January is allegedly binding, meaning that should it pass the national assembly will be obligated to ratify the EU accession treaty. Should the referendum fall, however, the Minister of External and European Affairs has explained it will just be repeated six months, or one year later. A Yes vote then is binding, but seeing July 2013 is still far away, a No vote this Sunday may not even postpone the accession.

Naturally this is having a demoralizing effect on the opponents of Croatia joining the EU making it all the more certain the referendum will pass at the first time of asking. Indeed, opinion polls indicate those opposed to EU membership are considerably less likely to turn out than those in favor. With the widespread understanding the government will make sure the country joins one way or the other, many opponents will not be bothered to engage in a symbolic, but ultimately futile act of registering their opposition.

Another factor that is skewing the field is that the campaign against the EU is wholly reliant on voluntary donations to the cause, but the government pro-EU campaign can spend money from the state budget. The latter has therefore been appropriately lavish, mailing a slick propaganda brochure to every private home in the country, setting up a propaganda telephone call center and buying up add space on 17 local television and 80 radio stations (which is to say the majority of TV and radio stations in the 4-million country). The importance of this immediate pre-referendum campaign, however, pales in comparison to the sustained pro-EU campaign of the last 15 years on the national public television, which at one point stooped to such depths as to broadcast a series of EU-themed propaganda shows aimed at children (produced in cooperation with the European Commission).

That despite all of this support for EU membership hovers around only 55% represents something of a failure of Europeanists to definitely sell the public on the idea of joining the flawed supranational proto-state obviously in crisis. Existence of headstrong anti-EU constituency among Croatian voters, however, has not moved a single parliamentary political party to improve its position by catering to this part of the electorate. The situation parallels that in Slovenia before its 2003 NATO referendum with the public divided on the issue, but the political class completely unanimous in its endorsement of membership.

Croatian opponents of EU membership ascribe aversion of notable political parties to adopt an anti-membership platform mainly to the politicians' keen sense of knowing which side their bread is buttered on. Indeed, it is unwise to downplay the importance of personal incentives in any situation, and particularly in this case seeing an added layer of bureaucracy the EU brings represents a veritable make-work program for politicians and their friends. The more fundamental reason why no party will step forward, however, has to be a lack of confidence. After all a party that did so and captured some of the sizable anti-EU constituency could do very well for itself and its friends nationally. This, however, would require a bit of boldness and daring — and that is something that is nowhere to be found these days, especially among politicians and then especially in Eastern Europe.

Why RJ Rummel Shouldn't Be Taken Seriously

2011-12-29T04:12:00.000+01:00

RJ Rummel is a political scientist best known for his contribution to the "democratic peace theory". He is also the author of the book Death by Government where he claims that states in the 20th century were responsible for killing around 174 million people. Interestingly this figure is frequently quoted by libertarians who are dismissive of the rest of his output; his "democratic peace" and his advocacy of aggressive foreign policy. It can be quickly shown his work on "calculating" the number of victims of governments calls for the same treatment.

We can ignore the fact his "most probable estimate" of deaths the responsibility of the Soviet Union presupposes 40 million deaths in the gulag, which happens to be twice the number of people who passed through the camps. We can also ignore his "high estimate" of the number of people killed by the USSR presupposes the murder of a fantastic 115 million Soviet citizens — a number of deaths sufficient to demographically break a far more populous nation than the Soviet Union (148 million people in 1926). Ignore also his having "calculated" that Soviet Union extinguished 2.38 million lives in the gulag between 1961 and 1982, and an additional 200,000 lives between 1983 and 1987. Ignore, because there is an even better way to showcase the level of his scholarship than debunking any of these. Better because it is made by Rummel himself.

In Death by Government Rummel claimed 174 million killed by government, but has since revised the figure to 262 million. This is partly the outcome of his changing his estimate of the number of people killed by colonial regimes from 870,000 to 50,870,000! Rummel explains this revision became necessary when, having read a book on Belgian colonialism in Congo, he realized he had been ignorant of a huge state-caused loss of life in that African territory. That seems like an honest explanation, but should he really be left of the hook this easily?

To begin with, the enormous loss of life in colonial Congo is hardly new (or obscure) information that was not available before. Rummel himself gives examples of sources (including Encyclopedia Britannica) that speak about it and were published well before Death by Government:

"Britannica, 'Congo Free State' claims that the population declined from 20 or 30 million to 8 million."
"A 1904 report by Roger Casement’s estimated that as many as 3 million Congolese died since 1888 (cited in Gilbert’s History of the Twentieth Century; also in Colin Legum, Congo Disaster (1972)."
"Peter Forbath (The River Congo (1977) claims that at least 5 million killed."
"John Gunther (Inside Africa (1953) estimates 5-8 million deaths."
"Fredric Wertham, A Sign For Cain: A Exploration of Human Violence (1966) estimates that the population of the Congo dropped from 30M to 8.5M, a loss of 21.5 million."

Also, it is not the case Rummel found 50 million victims he was not previously aware of in Congo. No, it is the case that having read a book on one specific colonial experience he became aware of the level of atrocity colonialism rested on and so he now figures the number of victims in Congo and elsewhere could add up to something like 50,870,000. This means he could have easily picked up a study on any number of brutal colonial regimes besides the one in Belgian Congo and it could have had the same effect of convincing him his figure of deaths caused by Western colonialism was off.

In other words, Rummel admits that at the time of writing Death by Government he was ignorant of the true nature of colonialism, but in a manner of a dilettante gave the 870,000 figure anyway. Professor Rummel can be commended that having learned something new he admitted to his delusion and revised his claim. However, if an author is going to make errors of this magnitude he probably should not be merely "reevaluating" estimates, he should be reevaluating whether he has any business writing books on the topic.

Going Home at Last: Say Farewell to Ramadi, Nasiriya, and Balad

2011-12-14T23:56:00.000+01:00

American withdrawal from Iraq is proceeding on schedule and it seems likely that come December 31st US military will have completed its retreat from that tortured country giving us the closest thing to the end of American war in Iraq that, in an age of never ending wars, we were ever likely to get. This being the case it would be a good time to examine if United States is coming home victorious having achieved its war goals, or defeated having failed to meet them.

It is no easy thing to determine what the war aims of the United States in the Iraq War were. In large part this is because United States leadership itself did not have a clear picture of what the purpose of the war they were launching was. What time the Bush administration devoted to envisioning a post-invasion Iraq consisted mainly of daydreaming with little concrete planning to go with. Nonetheless, it is possible to glean the gist of their vision from the rhetoric of the time and their conduct immediately after the invasion, when they still believed they would have everything they had fantasized about.

Post-invasion Iraq, home to permanent US military bases housing thousands of American troops, would serve as an American military outpost in the world's richest oil region. But more than that it would end up a grateful, exemplary, pro-American democracy in the heart of the Arab World able to inspire millions toiling under tyranny to cry out for similar American benevolence.

To make sure this actually happened the United States would put off turning over Iraq to the Iraqis essentially for as long as possible — presumably a very long time. This would work, because somehow the same Iraqis who could not be trusted to be USA-adoring enough to erect a pro-American democracy right away, could nonetheless be counted on to be sufficiently grateful, or awestruck, they would not put forth meaningful pressure for the handover of power for a very long time.

In other words, behind the stated goal of "spreading democracy", USA was actually getting ready to apply in Iraq a variant of the recognizably colonialist model of "democratization" we know from Bosnia. A model under which a country is subject to foreign tutelage and governance by an unelected authority for the expressed purpose of making it ready for democracy, which however never seems to actually arrive.

Iraq would be run by a benevolent American administrator, originally the uber-Bushian Jay Garner, who would surround himself with hand-picked Iraqis for show. His reign would not necessarily be vicious, but he certainly was not going to govern according to the wishes of the Iraqi people. At an appropriate time in the undetermined future a suitably Washington-dependent Iraqi exile — presumably the uber-crony Ahmed Chalabi — would step in and take over as America's governor of Iraq.

From the start, however, Americans found themselves doing what they never anticipated they would have to do — make concessions. Whether it was sacrificing Garner when his outspokenness in support of Israel became an issue, to backing down from replacing Iraq's pan-Arab tricolor the occupiers soon found themselves forced to deviate from their fantasies to try to appease occupied Iraqis.

Paul Bremer's Coalition Provisional Authority was folded after just over one year with a hurried June 2004 "handover" to the Iraqi Interim Government of CIA asset Iyad Allawi, whose time in turn ended prematurely by the "purple finger" election of January 2005. The Shia-Kurd Iraqi government installed by the latter was initially weak, but was ceded competencies at a rate sufficient that, where Sunni Arabs and Sadrists had shunned the first parliamentary election as meaningless and illegitimate, no one could afford not to participate in the repeat race later that year.

Though presented at the time as vindication of its decision to invade Iraq and depose the Ba'ath Party these "milestones" actually marked a development whereby the United States was grudgingly backing away from its pre-invasion war aims. In retrospect the occupiers' decision to bow down before demands of the Grand Ayatollah al-Sistani to hold the "purple finger" election probably marked a turning point after which the US was more interested in salvaging appearances of a successful war and less about accomplishing its actual war aims of 2003.

Already battling a Sunni Arab-based resistance the occupation had no taste for the eventuality of facing a similar Shia Arab effort. Rather than lose a co-belligerent and gain an enemy the US appeased the Shia with a mix of bribery and concessions. On the one hand US training and firepower served to convince the Shia of Americans' usefulness to their government in their conflict against the Sunnis. On the other the US was relinquishing the reigns just quickly enough not to risk the Sadrists leading the Shia into revolt anyway. This process culminated in a present-day situation where, in stark contrast to the expectations of the architects of the 2003 invasion, the government of Iraq is beholden to its constituency to the extent this notably frustrates US imperial designs.

Probably for no better reason than to be able to point to at least one example of its strategic interests having been advanced by the Iraq War the US wanted for a portion of its troops to remain in Iraq indefinitely. It gave up on this idea when the government of prime minister Nouri al-Maliki would not defy popular will in order to meet Washington's request to grant its forces exemption from Iraqi laws. In a familiar pattern Unites States government then framed having to back down from its aims in Iraq as a policy success, but no one can believe the goal of USA in invading Iraq was to, just nine years later, be turned down by the government of Iraq on such a matter.

Maliki's conduct has hardly been that of a doctrinaire anti-colonialist, but he is no Ahmed Chalabi either. His government clearly distinguishes between its own interests in Iraq and those of the US. It stands willing to accommodate Washington, but not in a manner that would undermine its own position and expects to collect counter favors in turn.

Official Baghdad remains highly susceptible to US influence, but this could only be expected, seeing the relative difference in stature between a war-torn and dysfunctional Middle Eastern state and the world's only global power. The point is that with its military on the way out United States has no more clout over "liberated" Iraq than it could have had, without war, by simply rehabilitating Saddam Hussein in the manner of its 2004 rehabilitation of Moammer Gaddafi. If the US instead went to war, it was because it would not be satisfied to have merely the clout it has resigned itself to since.

Nine years after the invasion the US can no longer point to having gotten anything beside a massive State Department mission out of the war. Its forces are evacuating without having imposed its will to the extent necessary to accomplish its war aims, something that is normally called loosing. Add one more to the losses column then, if there is any room left.

One Chain

2011-12-05T23:46:00.001+01:00

14.11.2011, Catherine Ashton states she has faith in the "leadership abilities" of Boris Tadić adding that the Serbian president "knows there are things we must do together".
29.11.2011, Boris Tadić calls on Kosovo Serbs to dismantle the roadblocks in the north of Kosovo they have defended against repeated KFOR assault.
5.12.2011, Tadić complains it is always being expected of Serbian politicians to make decisions for which there does not exist majority support.

That's right, not only is the Serbian public saddled with a president who will not take his marching orders from them, but will instead stuff down their throats whatever directives from abroad, they have to listen to him feel sorry for himself as he does it.

And yes, for European officials to manifest leadership abilities means to obey, specifically to obey European officials in place of speaking for the people. Leadership is obedience. Who knew?

Serbian Public and the EU

2011-11-29T23:43:00.000+01:00

Level of support for EU membership in Serbia, October 2007 - October 2011

A survey of public opinion that was recently conducted in Serbia revealed support for EU membership in the country has finally tanked. As late as June this year the level of support stood at 60.8%, but has since dropped to 47.4%. Even so, with 37.5% opposed, supporters of membership in the EU still claim a ten point lead over those opposed. So then Serbs, nonetheless, remain pro-EU and all is, nonetheless, good in the world for Brussels? Well, not really.

Asked if they would support Serbia establishing the closest ties with Russia possible 59.3% answer in the affirmative, while 21.2% are opposed. That means those in favor of stronger links with Russia claim a thirty-eight point lead over those opposed. EU membership may be popular, but links with Russia are more popular still.

82% of Serbs think of Russia as a country friendly to Serbia, while 5.1% claim it is a country hostile to Serbia. 27.7% see the European Union as an entity friendly to Serbia and 42.1% see it as an entity hostile to Serbia. 20.7% see Germany as a friendly power and 55.7% as a hostile power. 11.5% see Great Britain as a friendly power and 65.9% as a hostile power. In other words, sympathy for Russia is wider than the number of those who see the benefit in close political ties with Moscow. Meanwhile support for EU membership does not imply that Serbs believe Western European powers, or even the EU, wish Serbia well.

What is more citizens of Serbia are skeptical EU membership would benefit Serbia to any great extent. 45.4% express agreement (23.2% agree strongly) with the statement that EU membership would bring Serbia more harm than gain while 43.2 percent disagree (18.6% disagree strongly). So then, what explains the situation where the people of Serbia continue to support associating with hostile states in a possibly hostile supranational entity they are no longer willing to automatically assume is tantamount to a better life? The reason is the influence of argument of appeasement.

Many in Serbia believe they have been and continue to be punished for the fact their political leadership in the 1990s did not show sufficient eagerness to join Euro-Atlantic integrations. Some of them believe that if Serbia were an EU member — and thus a nominal member of the club of western states — it would be less likely that Americans and Western Europeans would act against it. Both because they would be less inclined to do so and because they would have less room to act in such a way.

Naturally, that one part of support for EU membership comes from people who desire it just because they believe Serbia in the EU could breathe more freely, means support for making concessions in order to join the EU is nowhere as strong as the figure of people in favor of membership could lead one to believe. 9.2% would be fine with Serbia "ceasing to support" the Serbs in the north of Kosovo if it meant getting EU candidate status in December — 75.5% want none of that.

What Worth Kosovo?

2011-11-28T00:05:00.000+01:00

Army of Yugoslavia in orderly withdrawal from Kosovo, 1999

In Serbia there is a thesis that Kosovo was lost in 1999. The point of the thesis being the province should be written under losses and forgotten about so that Serbia may turn to transforming itself according to the wishes of Brussels and Washington in the territory it still controls.

It is not an openly stated thesis of the government, which claims to be in pursuit of mutually exclusive goals of defending Kosovo and moving towards Euro-Atlantic integrations simultaneously. It is a thesis of a junior government party, the NGO crowd and a coterie of paid-for mercenaries of the pen who represent the elements of the regime who tend to say what the government only thinks.

It is a curious thesis considering the Kosovo War ended with Washington legally binding itself to respect Serbia's sovereignty in Kosovo by voting in UNSCR 1244. It is true the Americans could not be expected to intend to abide by the 1999 settlement, but then it was up to Belgrade to do all it it can to nonetheless preserve as much of it as possible. This is exactly what the current regime in power in Serbia never intended. If Kosovo should be lost for Serbia it will not be because it was lost in 1999, but because after 2000 Serbia was largely run by people who wished it had been lost then.

It is plausible that just remaining a state capable of autonomous action may have proved sufficient for Serbia to deter the occupiers from assaulting the original settlement and risk unwanted incidents with potential for escalation. Certainly KFOR would be more reluctant to undertake actions like the current assault against the four municipalities in the north of Kosovo if Serbia were known to be ready to issue a demand for KFOR to desist and to dispatch hundreds of Serbian police (something envisioned by the UNSCR 1244) to the north if the calls were not heeded. Particularly if it had not dismantled and purged away much of its army so that it had something to potentially back the police with.

Counter-intuitively as it sounds in one critical aspect NATO occupation of Kosovo actually enhanced Serbian position vis-a-vis NATO. During the bombing of 1999 NATO faced a problem of how to hurt an enemy whose army is camouflaged, dug in and has no need to conduct large scale troop movements or concentrate its forces. It resolved the problem by going after civilian targets instead. Serbian forces faced the opposite problem of how to hurt an enemy that is content to bomb civilian infrastructure and will not drop bellow 15,000 feet. After it was conclusively shown the Army of Yugoslavia would not able to protect the civilian population from a redoubled effort of NATO against their livelihoods, or to exact a price on NATO for conducting it, Yugoslavia negotiated an armistice. NATO occupation of Kosovo that followed, however, gifted Serbia the capacity to inflict damage on NATO and should have resolved the basic strategic problem Serbia had faced in 1999.

With NATO troops on the ground in Kosovo any potential future conflict would be certain to involve the one thing the alliance proved in 1999 it could not afford — casualties. Certainly NATO valued its objectives in Kosovo high enough it was willing to bomb civilians from the air, but did it ever consider them worth chancing own losses? It was clear since its onset that Western interventionism in the Balkans was conducted under political constraints that ruled out land combat and accompanying casualties. The point is not that Serbia should have engaged NATO in a land war, but that the value scale of Western occupiers meant Serbia had the levers needed to make sure they would not stray too far from the settlement that ended the war in 1999.

This would have involved nothing terribly original, but only applying pressure on the internationals of much the same kind that had been applied against them by Kosovo Albanians. On March 2004 Albanians tested the commitment of NATO to its stated goal of protecting the remaining Serbs in Kosovo. Facing aggressive Albanian mobs KFOR troops fled (with notable exceptions like the Czech and the Irish contingents) leaving the Serbs unprotected. Its commitment put to the test NATO discovered it valued its safety over its stated goal of protecting Kosovo Serbs from homicidal mobs. Later when the internationals proclaimed the policy-line of "standards before status" Kosovo Albanians responded with the "Vetëvendosje" movement and tested this stated goal of internationals. In the end the internationals 'resolve' to see through cosmetic changes in the way Priština institutions conducted themselves before enabling Kosovo Albanian proclamation of independence from Serbia did not show itself strong enough to brave menacing graffiti and youths pelting UN vehicles with stones.

The parallel is not fully applicable because, for one Kosovo Albanians had it easy in that they were merely forcing the internationals to chose between two objectives of their own. Part of the reason why KFOR failed to protect the Serbs against the 2004 pogrom is that it at some level preferred to see them gone itself. Part of the reason why any thought of conditioning independence from Belgrade on the much touted "standards" was so quickly put aside was that the internationals too saw furthering detachment of Kosovo from Serbia as a victory for themselves. Furthermore seeing that Kosovo Albanians are dependent on the presence of internationals for their own goals, Albanian resentment over a semblance of restraint placed on them was never going to actually result in a full on campaign to expel the internationals. The implied threat was of only limited disturbances against the internationals, coupled with far nastier ones against the remaining Serbs south of the Ibar river. Nonetheless — but for the odious notion of using defenseless civilians in your midst as hostages that should definitely not be mimicked — the same method of pointing out the contradiction between continued adherence to a policy and a guarantee of total safety and forcing a choice between the two could have produced results for Serbia as well.

As it was, every time the occupiers proceeded with taking the realities on the ground further away from those envisioned by the 1999 armistice they could do so with the luxury of knowing for certain any development that may lead to losses on its side would be avoided. Serbia stood by as four thousand Serbs were burned out from their homes in the March 2004 pogrom, stood by as the Empire proclaimed Kosovo detached from it, approved of UN administration delegating its most important tasks to the EU, and stands by right now as NATO assaults the four solidly-Serb northern municipalities without even as much as a verbal condemnation. If the state of affairs in Kosovo today is so unfavorable for the Serb side it is because official Serbia never tested the commitment of Westerners to their goals in a region it is unclear they consider worth the bones of one Pommeranian grenadier.

State Serbia

2011-11-27T07:42:00.000+01:00

USAF F-16 and crew on a 'goodwill visit' to Serbia military base (2006)

Last month, days before KFOR would launch its most ambitious string of attacks against the roadblocks in the north of Kosovo, the president of Serbia told the embattled communities in the north that "Belgrade was firmly at their side, but that a solution must be found to allow KFOR to pass past the barricades". What can be made of a head of state who, at the height of a crisis involving his citizens and an occupying army, has as his driving objective to ensure privilege for the latter?

What has happened to make such an unnatural state of affairs a reality? Did some years prior American tanks roll into downtown Belgrade and install a pliant regime? Well, not quite. Serbia was subjugated, but not by force. It was defeated by subterfuge, without having fired a shot in its defense.

How in turn was it possible for a people as freedom-minded as any to lose it so easily? It turns out because they have a state set above themselves that can be used against them they can be checkmated with little expense. A people that could not be broken in war in 1999 were brought under Imperial domination a year later with suitcases of cash. Since 2000 Empire has been able to make sure successive governments of Serbia would be in whole or in part made up of its clients.

What is more, Empire's position in Belgrade has never been more assured. Impressed with the ability of Washington to see patriotic parties thwarted — election results be damned — a part of oppositionists have sought its favor, so that now the Empire has in its pocket not just the government parties, but also the largest opposition party. Where 2008 elections were anticipated as an event that would finally rid Serbian government of Imperial influence — which they would have, but for US Embassy engineered defection of the Socialist Party of Serbia from the ranks of patriotic parties to the ranks of State Department clientele — it is apparent in advance the 2012 elections will change nothing.

What best illustrates just how far gone official Serbia is, is how utopian the eminently reasonable calls of Serbs under occupation for Serbian police and army to make a return to Kosovo sound in the present climate. With Serbia in the grip of collaborationists it would be beyond absurd to hope for it to deliver on the central promise of the nation-state — to defend its people against foreign threats.

It was not always so. Founded in rebellion against an empire, Serbia is the model national state. Initially it encompassed only a small portion of the Serbian people but tasked itself with a mission to liberate all of them. It would end up warring half a dozen times until there were no longer any Serbians under the Ottoman or Habsburg Empires. Serbia in 1914 and 1999 and Yugoslavia in 1941 and 1948 showed remarkable firmness in refusing Austria-Hungary, Germany, the Soviet Union, the USA — all far greater powers than they. It seems if anyone should be expected to be able to make independence for a smallish nation-state a reality it should be the Serbs, jet the Serbian state in 2011 is effectively an instrument of the Empire.

As established, historically Serbia is on its own terms a successful state, its rise coincided with freedom for the Serbian people from the empires they had ben subject to. There is the question as to whether this was because its organization as a centralized nation-state or despite it. Svetozar Marković, the famous Balkan agrarian socialist and fierce anti-statist, for one railed against the 19th century Serbian bureaucratic state including because it, in his opinion, made the Serbs less agile and active in the struggle for liberation than they should have been. Considering that a few years after his death Serbia under king Milan accepted the suzerainty of Austria, sparked a rebellion by attempting to disarm its populace and wasted blood and treasure on starting a war with brotherly Bulgaria it would seem he had a point.

Nonetheless even if the nation-state in the past struggles for freedom was not an asset, but a ball and chain as Marković believed, it was not so heavy that it could not be made up for with greater effort. It was possible then, in times past to be a nationalist and be able to say with a straight face to be motivated by passion for freedom. In an era where the nation-state increasingly serves as a magnificently effective shortcut for establishing of foreign control that should no longer be the case.

Anyone interested in their nation's freedom should see from the Serbian example what a liability the centralized state is. Organizing in a manner where there are no means for defense, but those under the absolute control of one government, just about invites able foreign powers to buy off the people at the top of the pyramid and paralyze a nation's ability to offer resistance. In a world grown so small that a nation can potentially fall prey, not merely to its neighbors, but to a power anywhere on the globe it is a fatal weakness.

They should likewise note the contrast between the lethargy of the people in nominally unoccupied Serbia and the alertness and the resolve of their countrymen in the north of occupied Kosovo. Since they are part of a single nation what explains the difference? Is it that one of them are stateless and the others can be thwarted with a strategically placed suitcase of cash?

Stateless Serbia

2011-11-21T12:35:00.000+01:00

Stateless in Serbia

I would like to provide more of a background to my statement in the last post the north of Kosovo is among the freest places on the world, particularly because an area which is effectively stateless must be of interest to libertarians.

There are two state-like entities which lay claim to the area in question, however, neither of them is able to exercise power in it. Washington keeps out the police and military of Republic of Serbia and the locals keep out every single institution of the quasi-state governed from Priština. That leaves the area with a number of civilian state institutions of Republic of Serbia, but seeing the organs of compulsion of Republic of Serbia are out of the picture cooperation with them is de facto voluntary. In other words while Republic of Serbia has a presence in occupied Kosovo, it is not the presence of a coercive state.

Looking to change this condition of statelessness of the four northern municipalities are the occupying forces. This July KFOR and EULEX moved to install Kosovo Albanian police to the crossings to unoccupied Serbia in the north and to enforce there the sort of border regime the government in Priština wants. There is no doubt this would have been just the first step in a larger effort to hoist an unwanted state upon the north had things gone according to plan.

They did not, however, go according to plan. The Serbs rose up and KFOR and EULEX proved utterly and totally incapable of extracting compliance by force. As there is not the slightest bit of compliance there is neither a state, merely the presence of dangerous, armed goons in government-issued costumes. Absolute resolution of the people of the four northern municipalities not to give way defines the danger the occupying forces represent. Since no one will bow down before them the occupiers' potential for violence presents a great risk for injury and tragedy, but poses no threat to freedom. The locals having determined they will take any injury before they will see NATO impose an unwanted state upon them have eliminated the possibility the occupying forces can act as an organ of state compulsion.

No Surrender by Government

2011-11-19T12:31:00.001+01:00

In the last two months in Kosovo there have been three ethnically motivated attacks that have resulted in a fatality. October 2nd father (51) and son (24) were gunned down leaving the son wounded and the father dead. October 20th three men were gunned down, with one of them killed. November 9th a group of young men rushing to the aid of their colleague who was being savagely beaten was sprayed with automatic fire leaving two of them wounded with one of the pair later dying.

What all three attacks had in common was Albanian assailants and Serb targets. The two attacks in October occurred in territories under the sway of the government in Priština and targeted Serbs who had shown signs of objecting to their property being usurped by Albanian neighbors. The last attack occurred in a mixed neighborhood in divided Kosovska Mitrovica. All told more than one thousand Serbs have been killed in occupied Serbia since the onset of NATO occupation, most of them immediately after its onset.

Clearly the remaining Serbs in Kosovo are in a truly unenviable position. Those in the part of Kosovo under control of western backed Albanian government in Priština live in in tiny, scattered ghettos subject to never-ending torment by ordinary Albanians, and their police alike. Those in the north of Kosovo have so far escaped this fate, but are under assault of western occupiers to extend their dependency in Kosovo northwards, presumably so that they too may experience the fate of Serbs in the rest of Kosovo — the inauguration of KLA rule in the form of mass expulsions followed by a daily agony of vandalism, extortion, and beatings for those who stay.

Nevertheless, at least the less unfortunate Serbs in Kosovo, those in the compactly Serb-populated north can also be envied. They can be envied their spirit and the freedom they have established for themselves in resisting all that would have them subdued by force — or by treachery. In an unlikely outcome the north of Kosovo in spite of all the force aligned against itself nonetheless finds itself among the freest places in the world. Its defiant inhabitants are subject to no state authority except that which they embrace willingly.

Attempted imposition of institutions of the Kosovo protectorate by NATO forces is being successfully fought off. Despite efforts of the occupiers to forcefully dismantle the barricades protecting the locals from the encroachment of an unwanted quasi-state they remain, as sturdy as ever. In the few instances where people guarding the improvised roadblocks were overpowered and the obstacles cleared, new barricades quickly replaced the barriers yielded. Effective peaceful resistance against the occupiers quite literally leaves them in control of no more than the soil under their boots and wheels.

This success, however, could have been all for nought if the people squaring off against KFOR neglected to guard their back against their own government. The imperiled communities of the north of Kosovo remain their own masters only because they have prevented the politicians in power in Belgrade from delivering them to their enemies. These had already agreed for the government in Priština to establish a presence on the northern stretch of the dividing line between occupied Kosovo and the rest of Serbia — which is to say they had accepted a sort of thing one would expect if the miserable KFOR had already won out against the local Serbs. When it became obvious the pro-Imperial Serbian government was greasing the wheels of attempted NATO play for power in the north the indomitable local communities broke off with the quisling politicians.

Councilmen of the four northern municipalities have made it it known the pro-western government in Belgrade can no longer speak in their name. They have declared they consider any future and past "compromise agreements" between the Empire's Serbian clients in Belgrade and its Albanian clients in Priština made in their name null and void and demand an end to the EU sponsored "talks" between them. There will be no easy way for the occupiers to win this one — Kosovo Serbs have eliminated the ability of their government to surrender for them.

Paper Money Famine

2011-11-13T19:04:00.000+01:00

Churchill's Secret War: The British Empire and the Ravaging of India during World War II is a book by a science journalist Madhusree Mukerjee. It tells of British policy toward India in the Second World War and how it relates to the Bengal Famine of 1943.

Mukerjee reminds the reader that before the British conquest India was a rich land. Certainly the conquerors drawn to Bengal in the 18th century were of the opinion they were adding a magnificently wealthy possession to their empire. Under colonial rule, however, India and Bengal soon became synonymous for poverty and a frequent setting of famine.

During the Second World War the colony was made to contribute heavily to the British war effort. India's industries, manpower, and foodstuffs were made to serve requirements of the war the empire had involved itself in. This was merely the latest escalation in a long lasting exploitation of the colony. The British deemed their unwanted presence in India a service and therefore extracted "payment" for it from the colony in the form of the Home Charge. As the British obstructed the expansion of manufacturing in India lest it provide competition for their domestic industry, the export of agricultural produce presented the only way of realizing this transfer. Finally, since the empire set the transfer so high so much grain was extracted for export that the colony — which continued to produce more food than its need through the 19th century — was maintained in a condition of chronic malnutrition.

Unsurprisingly there was strong resistance to colonial rule that could only be overcome by large scale repression. As part of the August 1942 crackdown against the Quit India Movement alone more than 90,000 people were locked up and up to 10,000 were killed. Short on manpower the British at times resorted to attacking crowds with aircraft. In particularly rebellious districts authorities burned down homes and destroyed rice supplies. British India was not unlike an occupied land.

The book exposes the manifold causes of the Bengal Famine. To begin with mortality rate in Bengal under British rule was atrocious even in a normal year with some of that attributable to malnutrition. The immediate reasons why conditions deteriorated beyond this "normal" state of semi-famine was the catastrophic Midnapore Cyclone and the Japanese capture of Burma. The Cyclone storm and subsequent floods disrupted life and ruined crops and the loss of Burma severed links with an important source of rice imports to India. These two factors, outside British control, were probably enough for a disaster on their own, however, subsequent British policies made the crisis far worse than it needed to be.

Anticipating the possibility the Japanese could advance further, the British carried out a scorched earth policy in coastal Bengal, seizing rice stocks, motor vehicles, bicycles and boats. Seizure of boats was particularly disruptive as they normally represented the primary means of transportation and therefore of getting rice crops to the markets.

The loss of Burmese rice imports to India was not made up by imports from elsewhere, nor was India's obligation to supply British Indian troops abroad lessened. Instead, India was made to cover the loss of Burmese rice imports to Ceylon, Arabia and South Africa even though these territories were already better provisioned with food than India. Although in the years before the war India had become a net importer of food, importing at least one million tons of cereal per year — a figure that was not actually sufficient to cover its needs, but represented what it could afford to import after paying the Home Charge — the British now undertook to export food from India.

Anticipating food shortages that were certain to follow colonial administration moved to protect the strata of society most useful to the British Empire — administrators, soldiers and industrial workers. The way in which they supposed to do so was to buy up huge quantities of grain and store it for their use. It would acquire these stocks in the same way it acquired supplies for the war effort — by printing money.

The government acquired some grain by requisitioning, but for the most part it simply bought it. Some purchases it made on its own, others it contracted out to private traders. Big merchant companies were given advances of vast sums of money and instructed to purchase grain at any price for the government. The price of already precious grain skyrocketed and the Bengal peasant was priced out of the market. Between the purchases of the Bengal administration, the Government of India, the army and the industries that were recipients of government largesse, grain was sucked out from rural areas. Departments of government and industries crucial for the war effort secured huge stocks of grain — part of which would end up rotting as millions starved.

What made the looting of the countryside to this extent possible was the transfer of purchasing power away from the peasant and to the government and those the government made business with that money printing entailed. In the course of the war the money supply increased by between six and seven times, so that the British worried they were "within sight of collective refusal to accept further paper currency". Some cultivators ended up holding on to their grain rather than release it to the market, because with the currency so quickly depreciating grain was the most secure store of value.

The reason government purchases were so devastating for Bengali peasants was that most families owned tracts of land too small to sustain their families on their own. Even in a normal year they were not in position to store enough of their harvest to sustain them until the next one. They were not sellers of crops, they sold their labor to the big landowners and bought food. Now this meant competing with the government equipped with the printing press. Prevalence of effectively landless peasants in Bengal in itself was the result of British policies in India which had created the landlord class from what had been tax collectors before the conquest.

If all else being equal just the loss of Burmese rice imports and crop failure was enough to create a serious food deficit for India, there was no food problem for the British Empire taken as a whole. In fact London claimed that Bengal could not be fed, not for a lack of food, but for a lack of ships — supposedly shipping was so scarce that grain, which was available, could not be taken to India without disrupting the British war effort.

Prioritizing its war over the bare lives of three million of its subjects would have been bad enough, but Mukarjee shows that shipping was nowhere as scarce as London claimed, albeit it was certainly being mismanaged. For example there was shipping and food enough to build up a stockpile in the Eastern Mediterranean for the purpose of Allied invasion of the Balkans that would never come about. Also there were always ships aplenty to build up an enormous and ever growing stockpile of food in the British Isles that London government was actually building up for post-war use.

In reality the biggest obstacle to secure food for famine-stricken India was not a lack of means, but a lack of will to allocate the resources necessary. Such readjustments would clash with the interest and the intent of the British Empire to exploit its colony for its purposes to the maximum.

To their credit not every Brit was of a mind with the London government personified in Winston Churchill. Many officials including high ranking ones like the Secretary of State for India, Leopold Amery and the Viceroy of India, Field Marshal Wavell repeatedly called for a decisive effort to relieve the famine. Governments of Australia, New Zeeland and Canada offered grain for India if United Kingdom, which had taken control of their shipping, would transport it there. British soldiers on the scene often defied orders not to help famine refugees handing over food from their own rations.

In addition to showing how the British Empire helped cause the Bengal Famine of 1943 and then denied it famine relief the Churchill's Secret War also provides the context for these two stories. Mukarjee recounts a fair bit of the dynamic between colonial metropolis and the colony centering on exploitation and resistance, explains the consequences of British wartime policies for the political future of the colony — partition and independence — and paints a picture of famine and repression as seen from the ground by offering vivid first hand accounts by people who were affected.

It is a book rich in content, but probably the one thing to take from it is the way in which the famine was made worse and its victims selected by government abuse of paper currency. British reaction to food shortages in Bengal was to protect the cities and industries at the expense of the peasants. Like the Soviet Union which had faced a food crisis of its own a decade earlier the British Empire figured it was up to it to decide who would live and who would die. Only where the Soviet method of robbing the countryside of grain in 1932-33 was requisition, the British method of choice in India was money creation. It was a more elegant method, but no less deadly and more difficult to rebel against. If the famine in 1932-33 in the Soviet Union was a requisition famine, the Bengal Famine of 1943 could be called a printing press famine.

US Embassy: "Dodik as Croat Hero"

2011-10-15T20:27:00.000+02:00

A section from a US Sarajevo embassy wire dated February 12th, 2010 published by Wikileaks states:

"Many Croats -- particularly the overwhelming majority who support a third entity, and including those who do not oppose Tihic as strongly as HDZ-BiH does -- have a great admiration for Dodik, some even regarding him as a 'hero,' because of his defiance of the international community and his disdain for the 'imposition' of the BiH state. Many Croats wish their own leaders would be as outspoken and carry as much bravado as Dodik. The Croats also appreciate Dodik's public expressions of support for a third entity, despite his insistence that the territory for such an entity come exclusively from the Federation."

The passage is instructive because it shows US sponsorship of "multi-ethnic" SDP, right up to using OHR to neuter Central Election Commission that had rightfully ruled SDP's entity government extralegal, is built around something the Empire knows perfectly well is a lie. US officials are perfectly aware their favorite political party in Bosnia can not speak for Croats of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

As the wire states, Bosnian-Herzegovinan Croats overwhelmingly support a third entity, a policy goal of HDZ BiH, which is the exact opposite of a unitary BiH — the policy goal of SDP. If Croats have an objection against their political leaders it is that they are too timid to stand against the foreigners pushing for centralization as boldly as Dodik does.

Foreigners stood behind the coalition gathered by SDP as it filled the nationality quota that sets aside government posts for Croats with its appointees, feigning bewilderment when HDZ BiH insisted SDP and the parties around it can not possibly represent Bosnian-Herzegovian Croats, who after all, overwhelmingly did not vote for them. The bit in this cable shows it is not the case Americans do not know they are supporting effective disenfranchisement of Dodik-appreciating Croats, they do — that's the point.

Erhard after Erhard, Pinocchio after Pinocchio

2011-10-08T21:08:00.000+02:00

Generalmajor des Heeres der Bundeswehr

Though it has been unmasked as infirm and impotent NATO Kosovo Force continues to maintain a nasty, repugnant facade. Just as their predecessors who developed the Nazi counter-insurgency doctrine of Bandenbekämpfung, KFOR continues to maintain it is being paired against criminal gangs. It continues to threaten to use force to achieve its goals albeit it is plain it is not capable of doing so. It claims it is reluctant to use force because of its concern for civilians, but is in fact reluctant because of its concerned for itself.

Unlawful Non-Combatants

Generalmajor Erhard Drews, who recently replaced generalissimo Erhard Bühler as the commander of the occupying forces, stated at a press conference yesterday the Jarinje incident of September 27th when American and German troops opened fire on unarmed protesters, wounding six of them, was the fault of "criminal groups from the north of Kosovo". Drews added Serb counter-blockade of KFOR control points does not count as peaceful protest and is unlawful.

Attempts of KFOR to scapegoat some mythical, ever-present criminal bands for its violence and repression in the north of Kosovo are perfectly see-through seeing what it has declared about the nature of the barricades. If the roadblocks put up by the blockaded communities are outside the law then anyone defying KFOR by standing vigil at them is a criminal regardless of what he, or she, does for a living. A less repulsive occupier would drop the pretense it believes Serb communities of northern Kosovo to be animated by some unseen "criminal structures" and just go with the part of the story where anyone engaging in an act of resistance is an outlaw by the virtue of not lying down.

We Could Win if We Wanted To

Drews engaged in further dishonesty when he implied KFOR could resolve the stand off in its favor using force if only it chose to do so. He threatened that KFOR "retains the right" to remove the barricades at any moment it deems appropriate and added the present situation "which pushes KFOR troops into small pockets around the crossings" could not be tolerated for long. He boasted that KFOR could "remove all the barricades in the north at any moment" and was already training to do so.

It is true the occupiers could remove the barricades, which are after after all manned by unarmed people. To overpower them should present only a trivial problem for a heavily armed occupying army. The self-confidence on display is a false one nonetheless. The technical challenge of removing the existing barricades is not the same as the challenge of ending the counter-blockade. Should NATO take over the existing blockades, it is a trivial matter for the Serb communities to erect new ones and reinstate the counter-blockade. The problem for KFOR is not how to remove the barricades, but how to break the will of the blockaded communities to resist.

Innocents are our Concern

Finally, Drews stated the reason KFOR is reluctant to move against the barricades is that it "would face the danger of injuring someone, of hurting innocent people". I suspect that Drews' predecessor, generalissimo Bühler, was rather more honest when he put the reasons for not escalating further as:

"I had the option to enforce and open up the roadblock. I decided not to do it because in the meantime so many criminals and extremists and armed people are here. It would be a nightmare."

The Serbs of the north of Kosovo have matched any escalation by the occupying forces with renewed determination and enterprise from their side, making it perfectly clear they are not going to back down whether they are being blockaded, threatened, or shot at. What is more they did so while displaying remarkable moderation in opting for non-violent methods of resistance. Should the noose around them continue to tighten indefinitely, however, then at one point they will have nothing left to lose by adding armed resistance to their repertoire — lord knows they have the means to do so.

Rather than NATO's concern for innocents, whom it has anyhow already placed outside the law declaring barricades illegal and non-peaceful, it is the fact that it is dealing with communities that are not totally defenseless that has so far kept KFOR at bay.

BiH: Finally Good at Something

2011-10-04T21:49:00.000+02:00

Bosnia: Good at government deadlock

Bosnia and Herzegovina just went one year without a government at state level. What is more, prospects the government will be formed any time soon are dim.

Agreement between the parties that won the election proved impossible on a number of specific, technical issues. The essence of the deadlock, however, is that there is no government because aggressive politics pursued jointly by the OHR and the main Muslim parties alienated the main parties of the Croats and of the Serbs from Sarajevo. Fed up, they are sending a message of no business as usual. Either the SDS and SDA and their international sponsors adjust course, or they will in Serb and Croat parties have a collocutor difficult enough to ensure that there will be no government — a situation with which their constituents are perfectly happy since they have no stake in the state in the first place, but are always happy to point out its dysfunction.

It seems likely they will remain happy for a while longer. Though the central state going without a valid cabinet of ministers should be a cause of concern for super-centralizers like the SDS and SDA this does not seem to be the case in BiH. Probably calculating a crisis makes increased foreign involvement likelier the Muslim parties have not budged an inch.

Politicians always have an incentive to cooperate, so there is an ever present danger political parties involved will leave principles aside and rush into each others' arms, but until that happens Bosnians and Herzegovians will continue to enjoy an existence plagued by one cabinet of ministers less and BiH will remain hot on the heels of Belgium, the reigning world champion of political deadlock and not having a government.

Drawing Blood

2011-09-27T18:41:00.000+02:00

American soldier on Serbian land: taking down a Serbian flag

Recall how the government of Serbia in early August justified its agreement with the NATO ocupiers that was really a surrender, by pointing out it at least barred KFOR from using force to try change the circumstances on the ground again? As predicted it turns this reassurance was groundless. The way the occupiers figured the deal only obliged them not to act unilaterally until September, for when a new round of talks was envisioned. Seeing the pro-Imperial government in Belgrade has always capitulated before an onslaught of forces behind the NATO occupation, these in turn have came to think of "talks" as using threats, deception or force to "create facts on the ground", then having Belgrade sign under them.

It may have worked once again except that another predictable thing happened. September 16th, when KFOR moved to install the personnel of the US sponsored Albanian government in Priština on the two crossings between occupied and unoccupied Serbia in the north of Kosovo, the imperiled Serb communities lost the last of their faith in Belgrade negotiators. Albeit the regime in place in Serbia would like nothing more but for Kosovo Serbs to stand down and accept the fate Washington has in mind for them, its one betrayal of them too many has deprived it of the means to influence their actions.

Without the Serbian government in position to sign under a capitulation on behalf of the Kosovo Serbs and bail out KFOR, the occupiers have found themselves in a difficult position. Everywhere in the north they are blocked in. Wherever they set up a control point to curtail the movement of the imperiled communities and cut them off from unoccupied Serbia they are in turn blockaded themselves. The locals have become expert at speedily constructing makeshift roadblocks, which they then man around the clock to prevent them from being dismantled and to monitor the occupiers from. As a consequence the only new meaningful "fact on the ground" is that KFOR can move about freely only in the air.

Today KFOR lashed out. Early in the morning German soldiers moved against a barricade near the Jarinje crossing and took it over with the help of tear gas. They tied up several people on the scene and destroyed the barrier. As word spread hundreds of people gathered on site to protest. After noon the occupiers demanded of protesters to disperse. When they did not, KFOR struck again using stun grenades and live rifle ammunition. Six people were wounded by live fire. NATO troops on the scene, a mix of Americans and Germans, did not refrain from firing at medical workers and ambulance vehicles extricating the wounded. Attempts to film the aftermath of the carnage were met with warning shots.

Two week ago, when NATO redoubled its efforts to bring the Serbs of northern Kosovo under the control of its client government in Priština it further imperiled their communities, but by creating distance between the pliant government in Belgrade and the resolute Serb communities it actually weakened its enterprise. Today NATO inflicted further grief on these people, but it did not do itself any favors.

A Must Read

2011-09-22T17:27:00.000+02:00

A paper from Dražen Pehar, a Croatian intellectual from Bosnia and Herzegovina, on his land under the tyranny of the 'international community'. He explains what the High Representative is:

"BiH with today’s High Representative is quite a pertinent example of a tyranny, or dictatorship, practiced in a very sophisticated form. BiH is endowed with a single sovereign, the HR, who, by his key marks and his status and origins, represents a sovereign in a pre-modern sense."

Unlike a modern sovereign who can be deposed by a free people, HR is a pre-modern sovereign, a 'Divine King' albeit in a sophisticated, up-to-date form:

"He is the sovereign who cannot be questioned, contested, or invited to respond before the tribunal of the people; his word is ultimate regardless of its inherent quality, of the question of its rationality, plausibility, morality, fairness… He is the sovereign one cannot negotiate with, or influence."

Pehar gives the background on how this came to be:

"In a period of time, in the second half of 1997, the Peace Implementation Council – PIC (for the implementation of the Dayton Framework for Peace in BiH) decided to interpret Annex 10 of the Framework in a way which transformed the HR to BiH into a body with unlimited legal powers. The Council has decided to interpret the powers of the institution in an infinitely wide fashion, or fully arbitrary, i.e. as the HR, or somebody standing behind him, deem convenient."

And why this represented a blatant power grab:

"If you read carefully Annex 10, which enlists the powers of the HR, you will soon realize that the institution should play the role of a benevolent assistant, a mediator in the best case, to the process of implementation of the peace in BiH. For instance, the Annex says that the HR is brought into being because the very parties to the Framework, the representatives of the BiH peoples primarily, have invited him to assist them. Legal existence of the HR is due to the will of the original parties to the contract, not the other way around (Annex 10, I.2)."

The paper goes on to give further arguments why this situation is indefensible, to name some of the effects it has had and to propose methods of resistance. It is well worth a read for anyone interested in Bosnia and Herzegovina or the various shapes of modern imperialism. Read it here.

Libya: Cowards' Bloody Hands

2011-09-18T00:24:00.000+02:00

The civil war in Libya is not over. Former regime loyalists remain in control of a few towns, which the rebels are trying to take over. NATO strikes continue. There have even been clashes among rival rebel factions. The extent of the fighting is not too great, but the extent of hardship it continues to impose on civilians is. The regime of Moammer Gaddafi has been deposed, however, ending one phase of the war.

Intervening powers took the overthrow of Gaddafi as a vindication of their actions, but they really should not. It has not been forgotten that in the months when the rebels did not seem to be going anywhere their anxiety and self-doubt were plain to see. Literally within days of their bombing campaign the aggressors' bravado fizzled out. It quickly became apparent none of the intervening powers was willing to take center stage and take on the expectation it would take on whatever burden it took to bring the war to a successful conclusion. Even the three major powers involved told their domestic audiences they were merely one cog in a wide coalition and that they really were not doing all that much.

Furthermore Gaddafi's regime did not crumble under the weight of NATO bombs, it was brought down when Berber rebel fighters organized by an Al-Qaeda linked jihadist captured Tripoli from Gaddafi forces. Indeed they had NATO air support, but then nobody ever doubted effectiveness of aircraft when used as flying artillery in support of ground forces. It is using aircraft as strategic assets that has never failed to produce only dubious results. What can justify all those bombing raids against Tripoli when it was still far behind the front line, raids which certainly killed many civilians, when in the end the city was taken by a few hundred Berber fighters, some Al-Qaeda organizing skill and a little NATO close air support? Even if we were to accept an idiotic a premise that Libya under the NTC will be a land of milk and candy, and an utterly amoral premise that this is worth a certain number of civilian deaths, those civilians killed in pointless raids against cities hundreds of miles from where the fighting was still died for nothing.

Case Ossetia and Case Kosovo: Not Quite the Same

2011-09-16T13:20:00.014+02:00

Lines of control in South Ossetia 1992-2008

Russian patronage of independence of South Ossetia and Western patronage of independence of the Albanian state in Kosovo are two relationships which are often compared. Sometimes they are compared by western interventionists who are looking for a way to show that the two relationships have nothing in common (for example here and here). And at other times they are compared by opponents of Western interventionism who insist that the two are analogous (for example here).

Opponents of the Empire are right to point out that having done its utmost to detach Kosovo from Serbia the West has no grounds to complain about anything that Russia does in regard to South Ossetia. Western interventionists, however, are right when they say that there are important differences between the two relationships, albeit they are wrong about what those differences are.

Whose protégé is independent?

The most important difference is that South Ossetia is de facto independent, but the Albanian state in Kosovo is not. This is not hyperbole. In Kosovo many of the functions normally performed by a national government are performed by officials from the UN or the EU. The Albanian state in Kosovo is not a sovereign state, it is an international protectorate.

Who intended to go against international law since the very beginning?

Another difference is that Russia had nothing to do with the South Ossetian declaration of independence from Georgia. When South Ossetia in the early 1990s declared its independence Russia refused to recognize it. For more than 15 years Russia maintained a principled position where it did not recognize any of the post-Soviet breakaway states. Had Georgia not launched a military invasion of South Ossetia that killed Russian soldiers that would still be the case.

This is a far cry from Western attitude to independence for Albanians in Kosovo. In 2008 when the Albanian government in Priština declared independence, it did so in coordination with the United States and its major allies, who had been laying the groundwork for this move since the onset of their occupation of Kosovo in 1999.

Who waged war to change the status quo and who meddled to establish a truce based on existing lines of control?

Another difference is that Ossetian control of South Ossetia did not come about because of Russia waging a war against Georgia. Serbia relinquished control of Kosovo because the United States waged a war against it, but Russia was not a belligerent in the 1991-92 South Ossetia War.

Russian pressure was a factor in Georgia signing the cease fire agreement that ended the 1991-92 war, but it was not the main reason Georgia did so. The most important reason why Tbilisi agreed to sign was that it wanted to turn inward seeing that what would become the Georgian Civil War was beginning to flare up.

Now, Russia did not have any business involving itself in the Ossetian-Georgian conflict in this way or in any other way. (What it should have done is offer North Ossetians to exit the Russian Federation and if they then wanted to involve themselves, that would be their business.) However there is a qualitative difference between what Russia did in the South Ossetia War and what America did in the Kosovo War.

Russia arranged for a cease fire that had each of the two sides remain in control of the parts of South Ossetia they held before the truce. America on the other hand subjected Serbia to 78 days of bombing (not diplomatic pressure) to force it to abandon Kosovo, just about all of which was under its control.

Who showed more hypocrisy and malice?

I will let you answer this for yourself.

National Defense in the Great Patriotic War

2011-09-16T00:13:00.004+02:00

In the Second World War the Soviet Union suffered an incalculable number of war death that is usually put at 27 million.ⁱ It was the largest death toll suffered by any country in any war. The war razed 1,710 cities and towns, 70,000 villages and hamlets and 100,000 collective farms on Soviet territory.ⁱⁱ In terms of protecting its citizens against other states the USSR can only be judged an utter failure.

The failure of the Soviet Union was all the greater because it was not a power that was simply powerless to do so. On the eve of the Second World War the USSR was larger by land mass than any other political entity in the world exempting the British Empire. It ranked third in the world by population size and by gross domestic product. It could boast the largest, most mechanized army in the world, an enormous heavy industry output and highly competent weapon designers.

To be sure the Soviet Union was also faced with its challenges. It had a very long border to secure. It had to contend with a two-pronged threat emanating from Tokyo on one side of the world and Berlin on the other. Enormous distances and subpar infrastructure impeded transport and communication. Most of its populace had little education and rarely handled modern machinery. What was to be its chief opponent, the German military, was experienced and proficient in the conduct of war.

These difficulties, however, were hardly insurmountable given the aforementioned strong points of the Soviet Union. Yet it would suffer a series of military defeats so catastrophic that at the greatest extent of Axis advance 68 million of its citizens would be subject to a deadly foreign occupation.ⁱⁱⁱ What was the cause of Soviet military debacles that paved the way for suffering on such a scale?

No Sleeping Giant

When the National Socialists took power in Germany the Soviet Union was sufficiently alarmed to come out of international isolation and move closer to France.^iv It interfered in the Spanish Civil War to stop a speedy defeat of the Republicans, hoping to in this way drive a wedge between Paris and London and Berlin and Rome.^v It provided military aid to Chiang Kai-shek attempting to blunt Japanese expansionism in the Far East and offered itself as an ally to France in the Sudeten Crisis.^vi It finally sought security by concluding non-aggression pacts with Germany (1939) and Japan (1941). The Soviet Union was not oblivious of international events, but was conscious of potential outside threats.

Between the years 1938 and 1940 the Soviet Union fought a war with Finland, an undeclared border war with Japan, forcefully annexed Bessarabia, the Baltic States and Ukranian and Belarusian areas of Poland. In 1930s it begun throwing much of its industrial capacity into armaments production so that by June 1941 it possessed 15,000 aircraft and 18,000 tanks — more than all the rest of the world combined.^vii The Soviet Union was pouring vast resources into its military, which had already fought to defended its borders as well as to expand them. It was anything but a complacent power that had not given thought to war.

Armed Forces

For much of the interwar period the Soviet armed forces consisted of two components. The smaller regular forces and the larger territorial forces. The later comprised a reserve army led by professional officers, but manned by part-timers who held on to their civilian jobs. In peacetime the territorial system represented a cheap method of training large numbers of men. In wartime it could quickly supplement the regular forces with second line units of some proves. In mid to late 1930s, however, the territorial army was swallowed up by the the regular forces. In this way the Soviet Union deprived itself of an organized reserve and became less able to fight an existential conflict on a short notice.^viii

The Achilles' heel of the pre-war Red Army was the poor quality of its officer corps. The army had difficulties attracting and retaining officers. Up to 1936 the Soviet Union barred Cossacks, former nobles and bourgeois, that is the classes that had provided the Imperial army with the bulk of its officers, from military service. Among the remaining population there was little inclination for military profession, especially seeing that until mid 1930s the pay was better in industry. Those who could hope to succeed elsewhere were inclined to leave the profession or never take it up in the first place. This state of affairs, coupled with persistent forcing out of officers deemed politically unreliable, left the officer corps under strength, undereducated and suffering from high turnover rates.^ix

Then in 1938 the Soviet Union launched an enormously ambitious program of military expansion. To the existing 98 divisions the Red Army in just two and a half years added another 205 for a total of 303 ground force divisions on the eve of war.^x At least as of 1941, however, such a titanic army could not be adequately trained, supplied and led. The benefit of the expansion was therefore to a sizeable extent questionable.

One problem was that it further diluted the quality of an already mediocre officer corps. To fill tens of thousands of command positions being created every year the training of new officers had to be rushed, which reflected on its quality. As there was no way of attracting so many new candidates to the profession, most new officers served by compulsion. Most new officers were conscripts who had been elevated to junior commander and then officer rank. The extent of their officer training was a special course that lasted between three and six months.^xi Many of the others were young Communists and Komsomols who were dispatched to abridged officer training programs in military schools as a way of fulfilling their obligation to the party. Even by taking such shortcuts officer shortages could not be eliminated entirely. On the eve of the war the infantry, which was the service branch most affected by shortages, had no more than 79% its prescribed number of officers.^xii

The army then was conscripting a huge number of men and placing them under command of officers that had been promoted to posts for which they were barely qualified. One predictable consequence of this was the poor quality of training of the rank and file. The training of soldiers overseen as it was by thinly spread officers in over their heads left much to be desired. To make matters worse training was often impeded by equipment shortages, particularly of boots and coats, and the need to devote time to erecting quarters, messes, stables and supply dumps for the enlarged army.^xiii Political indoctrination and growing food on unit farms represented additional distractions from acquiring military skills.

Increase in the size of the armed forces was done without an adequate increase in the ability of the rear services to supply the enlarged army and maintain its equipment in repair. It affected the planned modernization of the Red Army. With so many new units needed to be equipped old equipment could not be phased out.^xiv Industry spewing out weaponry could not pause to retool for production of alternate, superior designs. When the war broke out the majority of the enormous Soviet tank and air fleets, albeit state of the art in mid 1930s, would already be outdated. The newer models had only begun entering service so that there had not yet been time enough to properly train the men operating them.

At around the same time the military was engulfed by the purges of the Great Retreat and dealt a severe, debilitating blow. Just as the expansion of the Red Army greatly increased the need for trained officers regime had many of them censured, imprisoned and shot. At their most severe in 1937 and 1938, the purges did not cease until after the German invasion of 1941.^xv Over 34,300 officers were purged, albeit at least 11,600 were later reinstated, some of them after having endured torture.^xvi By losing 23,000 badly needed officers the army was rid of experience and expertise that could not be adequately replaced. The purges hit party members the hardest and so disproportionately affected high-ranking and more experienced officers that were more valuable.

The purges did more to the Red Army than just deprive it of useful officers. Their psychological impact was paralyzing. The purges stifled initiative, lowered morale and sapped enthusiasm.^xvii They hit research bureaus as well, inhibiting development of new weaponry and causing the Soviets to fall behind in aeronautics.^xviii They devastated military intelligentsia by liquidating the Red Army's most advanced theoreticians, wiping out the Red Army's lead in conceptualizing combined arms warfare. As the works of uncovered enemies of the people were thrown out of circulation, theories that had been part of the Red Army’s intellectual mainstay were now dangerous to voice.^xix

Predictably given its state, the Soviet military did not give a good account of itself in the Winter War. As if to provide contrast the German military shortly thereafter stunned the world by defeating France in a rapid manner, paving the way for German hegemony in Europe. Stalin responded by ordering a sweeping reorganization of the Red Army. Mobilization plans were revised, war plans laid out anew, commanders replaced, mechanized corps re-established, personnel retrained, responsibilities shifted, units rearmed.

The program of reform sensibly aimed to remove deficiencies that had revealed themselves in the war with Finland. The sweeping nature of the reforms, however, caused transition shocks and threw the massive burocracy that was the Red Army into temporary disarray. To make matters worse the reorganization of the army was so widely conceived that it would not be complete until mid 1942. Thus in 1941 when the German attack occurred the Red Army was in a worse state than if reform had never been attempted.^xx

In the 1930s the Soviet Union had clearly determined to respond to the deteriorating international situation by radically bolstering its military power. Its military spending rose steeply, it represented 3.4 percent of the state budget in 1933 but 32.6 percent in 1940.^xxi Expansion and reorganization of the army as well as the officer purge were measures central to its effort to enhance its military stature and were meant to decisively answer the question of its security. In its effort to prepare for war, however, the Soviet Union was aiming for more than it made sense to aim for given the time and resources available.

The Red Army in 1941 was a flawed force in a state of upheaval and nowhere yet ready for war. It was such precisely because of the combined shocks of an overly ambitious expansion, a sweeping reorganization and a murderous purge. The enormous scope and ambition of the effort to prepare the country for war actually worked against its purpose and undermined its effectiveness. On the eve of war Soviet defenses were nowhere near as robust as they should have been given the extent of energies invested into them.

Prelude to Invasion

Hitler begun planning an invasion of the Soviet Union as soon as France had fallen and committed committed to it by December 1940.^xxii The attack, code named Operation Barbarossa, would commence next summer.

Information gathered by the Soviet intelligence on the German buildup and intentions in the east was plentiful. Detailed and accurate reports from agents and military attaches abroad were received warning of a planned invasion. Military commanders and party officials from the border areas submitted reports detailing preparations for war taking place across the border. The ever increasing density of incursions by German reconnaissance aircraft, sometimes to a depth of one hundred kilometers, readily testified to the intention of the Germans. Despite these and many other indicators Stalin stubbornly refused to believe Germany was preparing to strike.^xxiii

Stalin had more than enough information needed to foresee the German attack. Red Army commanders G.K. Zhukov and S.K. Timoshenko did so albeit they were privy to far fewer intelligence reports than Stalin. When they asked for preparatory measures to be taken they were rebuked by the dictator. The difference between his army commanders and the dictator was Stalin's fear of disinformation. Facing a peculiar knowledge problem Stalin had access to vast number of various reports from his subordinates but no way of knowing if they were fully truthful or at least in part meant to mislead him. Consequentially he was inclined to mistrust reports and recommendations that went against his preconceptions. This being the case few would risk sowing suspicion about themselves in the dictator's mind by offering dissent. As a result albeit there were those who did not share Stalin's delusions, conditions for debate that may have swayed the dictator did not exist. Public debate on what the buildup meant was not possible in the state run press, and internal debate among officials was hampered by Stalin towering over the cowed state hierarchy.

As reorganization of the armed forces would not produce a truly combat capable Red Army until summer 1942 it had left the Soviet Union vulnerable. Aware of this weakness Stalin was extremely fearful of a war with Germany. This translated into an obsessive preoccupation with avoiding provocation that may give the Germans cause to attack and trigger a war he believed could be avoided. To this end severe restrictions were placed on the Red Army. It was to limit its air activity, it was not to take up defensive positions, it was not to speedily mobilize, it was not to fire on border violators.^xxivStalin was pursuing a policy of appeasement that was so extreme it was detracting from the ability of the Soviet Union to defend itself.

At the same time the obligations of the Soviet Union under the Soviet-German commercial agreements were fulfilled to the letter. In the eighteen months before the German invasion, the Soviet Union shipped two million tones of petroleum products and various other raw materials to Germany.^xxv These materials were difficult for Germany to obtain, but were critical to its industrial production and military buildup. Stalin hoped that by complying with the agreements he would help avoid war. As it was the supplies Germany received helped made its drive into the Soviet Union possible.

Appeasement could have its merits in the 1930s when Hitler was much less powerful and much more attuned to reality. Now that the victorious German armies had made him the master of Europe and his policies were guided by ideology and fantasy it is was positively nonsensical. It undermined any deterrent to attack the purged Red Army fresh from a fiasco in Finland still represented. Passivity of the Soviets in view of German border violations was interpreted as a weakness and made the war Stalin was hoping to avoid all the more certain.^xxvi The Soviet Union was even now incredibly powerful, but Stalin was inadvertently encouraging Hitler to think the opposite.

At least one other aspect of Stalin's activity in the international sphere would come to haunt the USSR. His territorial appetites acted upon in 1939 and 1940 provided Germany with its key allies in the east. Soon after Stalin forced Romania to cede Bessarabia the Soviet Union, pro-Axis elements took power in Bucharest and entered Romania into the Axis. Finland likewise linked with Germany hoping to recapture the areas it had been forced to cede to the Soviet Union in the Winter War. The contribution of Finns and Romanians to Operation Barbarossa would add up to 650,000 invasion troops.

Soviet empire building of 1939-40 was the means by which Stalin, after alternatives had shown themselves to be lacking in his eyes, meant to attain security.^xxvii Once more moving to tackle security challenges in a seemingly decisive manner played into German hands and made the Soviet Union less safe.

Invasion

German attack on the Soviet Union was launched on 22nd June 1941 and achieved surprise at every level. Because the Soviet state had cut the flow of information to its populace and army and sent them reassurances that proved deceptive the Soviet Union was caught off guard by the largest military offensive in world history.

When the war broke out only 2.8 million Soviet troops, of the 5.3 million total, were in theater and integrated into their units.^xxviii Even these were mal-deployed. Based on Soviet war planning the greater part of Soviet strength in the west was in the region south of the Pripet Marshes, but the brunt of the German attack came north of it.^xxix Early defense plans had been based on the correct assumption the main thrust was likeliest in the north, but had to be changed after Stalin signaled his disagreement.^xxx

Red Army units were garrisoned rather than in the field, oftentimes with component units spread out over a large area. Divisions were manned at half strength and lacked their full complement of artillery and ammunition. Particularly damaging was the severe shortage of trucks, radios and skilled radio operators. These deficiencies coupled with enemy activity, cumbersome organization and poor leadership meant resupply and command and control promptly broke down.^xxxi

Units struggled for fuel and ammunition, some were without food. Performance of the Red Army hierarchy was poor and contributed to the confusion. Numerous tank formations greatly dissipated their strength before they ever met the enemy as they abandoned broken down vehicles on forced marches urgently moving into position. Others received changing, contradictory orders shifting the destination they were to move to, until they ran out of fuel and could move nowhere.^xxxii

Operation Barbarossa ultimately failed to defeat the Soviet Union in a single blow as was its aim. It was a strategic failure for the Germans who had wildly underestimated the Soviets. The Soviet leadership for their part, however, wildly overestimated the Red Army. The Communist USSR with its can-do attitude had built an army geared for the attack, now that the war broke out it expected of its military to move on the offensive and carry the day.

Whenever possible Red Army Main Command threw units large and small into poorly coordinated counterattacks, counterstrokes and counteroffensives. These were bloody, suicidal affairs in which the Soviets were forsaking the one clear advantage they could still claim — the advantage of fighting on the defense. One after another fronts, armies and corps would be sent into the teeth of the stronger, advancing enemy.^xxxiii What ensued was a defeat in detail in which much of the massive Red Army was destroyed piecemeal. Numerous units were ground to dust attacking in appalling conditions that were crying out for defense or withdrawal.

By December 5^th, when it was finally stopped, Barbarossa had advanced more than 1,200 kilometers into the interior of the Soviet Union. It reached the outskirts of Moscow and delivered millions of people to the mercies of a lethal occupation. On the way it inflicted cumulative losses of 4.5 million on the Red Army including 2.3 million captured.^xxxiv

The extent of the territory lost and the blow to the Soviet military delivered guaranteed a protracted and bloody campaign to force back the enemy. Before the end of the Soviet-German War the Red Army would emerge as an accomplished and enormously capable force, but in late 1941 this was still a long time into the future. Before then the Soviets would continue to blunder regularly and experience defeats and debacles that greatly added to the casualty lists and pushed back the day of triumph. These, however, did not have consequences quite as far reaching as the blunders of 1941 and the prior years.

Final Words

Red Army retarded by the Great Officer Purge, destabilized by an ill-timed reorganization, stunned by the artificial surprise of the June invasion and thrown against the attacker under an unrealistic comprehension of reality could barely keep from not being annihilated, it made a poor protector of Soviet Union and its populace.

Catastrophic defeat of the Soviet Union early in the war was to a large extent self-inflicted. Advantages the USSR held over competing powers were negated by its own leadership. Softening up the Red Army for Hitler, providing him with allies, supplying his industries and gifting the German army the element of surprise were blunders that cost millions of lives. The enormity of war death and suffering in the Soviet Union was as much a consequence of incompetence and paranoia of the Soviet leadership as of the invader.

In the end the invader was pushed back and vanquished through the superhuman effort on the part of the Soviet people, of the factory worker, the Red Army man and the partisan alike. The reason this effort needed to be so enormous was because it needed to not only drive back the Germans, but also make up for the failings of the Soviet state. The Soviet people had to fight the war in the worst of circumstances, stuck between the hammer of Nazi invasion and the anvil of Soviet arbitrariness and repression and suffered accordingly.

What scholars easily agree on is that for all its other faults the Soviet system was without equal in mobilization ability which ultimately saved it. Mobilization ability, however, is nothing more than ability of the state to place its populace between itself and its enemies. In demanding ever more sacrifices from its people to make up for its incompetence the USSR was indeed expert.

In the Soviet Union more of life went through the state than anywhere else in the world and still the state in a spectacular manner failed to protect its people against a power that could approximate neither the size of its armed forces, nor the size of its military production. That the country in the ensuing struggle nonetheless emerged victorious is a testament to the spirit and sacrifice of the Soviet people. That it needed to bear such gruesome losses to do so, is a condemnation of the Soviet state that had nearly brought about its downfall.

i Michael Ellman and S. Maksudov, Soviet Deaths in the Great Patriotic War: A Note – Europe Asia Studies, July 1994

ii Velikaya Otechestvennaya vojna Sovetskogo Soyuza 1941—1945: Kratkaya istoriya (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1984), 497

iii Soviet territory under Axis control in November 1942 was home to 45% of USSR's populuation pre-war. The number of people under occupation is this figure less evacuees (16.5 million) and conscripts.

iv In 1935 France and the Soviet Union concluded a pact of mutual assistance meant to contain Germany.

v A.J.P. Taylor, The Origins of the Second World War (1961; reprint, New York: Simon & Schuster Paperbacks, 2005), 128

vi Ibid., 172, 177

vii David M. Glantz, Stumbling Colossus: The Red Army on the Eve of World War (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1998), 294

viii Roger R. Reese, Stalin's Reluctant Soldiers: A Social History of the Red Army, 1925-1941 (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1996), 32-33

ix Ibid., 100-130

x Glantz, Stumbling Colossus, 34

xi Ibid., 160

xii Roger R. Reese, Soviet Military Experience: A History of the Soviet Army, 1917-1991 (London and New York: Routledge, 200), 99

xiii Reese, The Soviet Military Experience, 95 and Reese, Stalin's Reluctant Soldiers, 174, 179

xiv Reese, The Soviet Military Experience, 95

xv Glantz, Stumbling Colossus, 26, 189

xvi Reese, The Soviet Military Experience, 87

xvii Glantz, Stumbling Colossus, 31-33

xviii David M. Glantz and Jonathan M. House, When Titans Clashed: How the Red Army Stopped Hitler (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1995), 37

xix Richard W. Harrison Architect of Soviet victory: The Life and Theories of G.S. Isserson (Jefferson and London, McFarland & Company, 2010), 194, 199

xx Glantz, House, When Titans Clashed, 44

xxi Reese, Stalin's Reluctant Soldiers, 166

xxii David M. Glantz, Barbarossa: Hitler's Invasion of Russia 1941 (Strout: Tempus Publishing, 2001), 14

xxiii Glantz, Stumbling Colossus, 233-246

xxiv Ibid., 246, 256 and Glantz, Barbarossa, 30

xxv Ibid., 30-31

xxvi Glantz, Stumbling Colossus, 256

xxvii Vojtech Mastny, The Cold War and Soviet Insecurity: The Stalin Years (Oxford and New York, Oxford University Press, 1996), 14-16

xxviii Glantz, Stumbling Colossus, 295

xxix Pripet Marshes are wetlands covering nearly 100.000 square kilometers in southern Belarus and northern Ukraine.

xxx Glantz, Stumbling Colossus, 90-93

xxxi Ibid., 129

xxxii Ibid 134-135, 137 and Stalin's Reluctant Soldiers, 199

xxxiii Glantz, Barbarossa, 59

xxxiv G.F. Krivosheev, Soviet Casulties and Combat Losses in the Twentieh Century (Pennsylvania, Stackpole Books, 1997), 93

Government Only Good for Surrendering

2011-08-13T19:08:00.003+02:00

After first objecting to the Serbia-KFOR agreement, which sanctifies a NATO enforced economic quarantine of the north of Kosovo, representatives of the affected communities met Tuesday to decide on whether to dismantle their roadblocks as called for by Belgrade anyway. They left without reaching a unified position. Since then, however, most of the roadblocks have gone down. Only one of them remains.

Defending the agreement Serbian negotiators admitted the deal was "not ideal", which is putting it mildly, but insisted it was "the best [deal] possible under the circumstances". That is very much true, the circumstances being that negotiations for the Serbian side were conducted by a government that has long been looking to surrender Kosovo, albeit careful to do it in a way that would not cause its immediate and dramatic downfall from power.

Aspect of the deal the government has been flaunting as its biggest positive is that NATO promises not to use force to unilaterally change the circumstances on the ground. No one in their right mind can take NATO seriously on this point, however, when the situation in force now is precisely the outcome of one-sided NATO action, and when Belgrade just signed under it.

The communities in the north of Kosovo elect their municipal officials under Serbian law and election schedule. It would be very difficult for these municipalities to ignore positions of the government of Serbia, when what they are struggling for is to remain a part of the constitutional order of Republic of Serbia. The government in Belgrade is not loathe to take advantage of this predicament of theirs.

The Serbs in the north of Kosovo were told that should they not abide by the Serbia-KFOR agreement official Belgrade would hang them out to dry. That would indeed put them in a tough spot, but it is hard to see the present arrangement where the marionette government in Belgrade will sign under capitulations in their name is any better.

Criminalizing Sit-ins

2011-08-12T17:53:00.028+02:00

Crimefighter Bühler

In the course of the current tensions in the north of Kosovo the commander of NATO forces, a Bundeswehr officer Erhard Bühler, on multiple occasions claimed the people obstructing NATO were criminals or in the pay of criminals. Bühler ascribes every aspect of local response to NATO enforced stranglehold of the north to "criminal structures" who allegedly run the whole north of Kosovo. He goes so far as to claim the people assembling at roadblocks had been paid by criminals to do so.

The German NATO general claims there are no problems in Kosovo of a political nature, troubles only arise from dissatisfaction of criminals. In other words, the Serbs have no valid reason to object to politics enforced by NATO, the only people who could object are criminals, so anybody who objects must be a criminal or in the service of criminals.

Bühler's propaganda points are as predictable as they are idiotic. Attempting to criminalize resistance to occupation has been long domain of powerful states and militaries. In the German case it begun with hysteria surrounding francs-tireurs in the Franco-Prussian War, then intensified through every subsequent conflict until it, in 1942, culminated in the formalized security doctrine of Bandenbekämpfung.

One pillar of German security thinking was that any resistance to occupation was illegitimate. A person offering resistance behind the front line was not to be thought of as a legitimate fighter — a partisan, but as a bandit, which is to say a criminal. An area where resistance existed was to be thought of as a bandit area and the people among whom the partisans moved as people harboring criminals.

There exists a perception Germany laden with a Nazi past is now more pacifistic than other comparable powers. It is a view that can not but bemuse the northern Kosovo Serbs in the sights of a belligerent German general resurrecting talking points of Bandenbekämpfung in relation to unarmed people staging sit-ins.

Tightening the Noose — With Belgrade's Blessing

2011-08-07T19:28:00.005+02:00

When last month the KLA-staffed government in Priština attempted a takeover of the Jarinje and Brnjak border posts between Kosovo and unoccupied Serbia it showed itself incapable of doing so. The reaction of the local population forced its speedy withdrawal. Instead NATO took over the crossings in its place and enforced a blockade on the Serb enclave in the north of Kosovo for it. This week official Belgrade attempted to grant the blockade its official blessing.

When the crisis first broke out Serbia dispatched negotiators to demand a return to the state of affairs as it existed before the attempted Albanian takeover. This would mean a withdrawal of American and French NATO troops occupying the border posts and an end to their barring Serbian goods from crossing the administrative border. Instead, the government's negotiators signed under every aspect of the state of affairs currently in place — except under the roadblocks set up by the local Serbs.

The settlement the Serbian government had agreed to would have the NATO blockade of the north continue. Exactly as it is the case at the moment only people would be permitted to cross the administrative border, but not goods. The only way in which the deal would perhaps improve the existent situation is that NATO would promise to let pass humanitarian aid shipments. As a precondition to the agreement becoming valid the makeshift roadblocks impeding NATO access to the border posts would have to be dismantled.

In summary, the Serbs in the north of Kosovo — who are facing a shortage of provisions and medical supplies — were called upon by their government to abandon their most effective avenue of resistance and protest so that in return a NATO enforced economic stranglehold on their enclave may be formalized and they be reduced to dependence on shipments of humanitarian aid.

Needless to say the roadblocks remain in place. The people who would be affected by the blockade rejected the deal the marionette government made in their name and ostensibly for their benefit. One thing the independent-minded Serbian community in the north of Kosovo can teach us is that the best hope for dignity lies in breaking away, not from your country, but from your government.

Values Clash

2011-07-30T10:39:00.059+02:00

Vidkun Tadić

The only true value of the current Serbian government is pathological deference to Imperial power exercised under the guise of extreme pragmatism, defeatist fatalism and supposed aversion to conflict. Appropriately, it has long been expected the government in Belgrade will act as an agent of Empire in Serbia. Wednesday, however, the government went even beyond that.

Monday evening Albanian government in Priština moved its paramilitary police to occupy the two crossings on the border between occupied Kosovo and the rest of Serbia in the solidly Serb populated north of the province. This was done days after the KLA-staffed government in Priština declared goods from unoccupied Serbia would no longer be allowed in Kosovo. The ban on imports coupled with control of borders by the government in Priština would enforce a stranglehold on the Serbs in the north, with a view to subdue them, or force them out.

When this happened the first reaction of the Serbian authorities was to categorically rule out coming to the aid of the imperiled Serbs in the north of Kosovo. (They were more concerned to prevent any rallies in their support from being staged in Belgrade.) The people there, however, have long learned not to look to the government, but to rely on themselves. Within hours they had the roads leading to the crossings blocked by setting up makeshift roadblocks and standing vigil, thus blockading the Albanian police at the border posts.

NATO first claimed the action of the government in Priština had not been coordinated with it, then quickly saw to it that it was. When the Serb response forced the evacuation of the paramilitary police, NATO decided to ferry in regular police from Priština to take their place. Reacting to this turn of events, Wednesday local Serb youths chased away police from one of the border posts and set fire to it.

On this occasion, however, the Serbian government found uncharacteristic courage to issue a strongly worded attack — against the Serbs! President Tadić labeled the young adults who had demolished the border post "hooligans" and other government officials took to denouncing them as "extremists". (International media followed suit styling them "hard-line Serbian nationalist".)

It is difficult to see why the local Serbs should have any obligation not to hurl petrol bombs at a hideous control post set up on their land against their wishes. One manned by foreigners who had attacked the country unprovoked and who task themselves with impeding their freedom of movement in their own country. The Serbian government condemned an act of resistance against the NATO occupation openly siding against its people.

Its nasty denunciations are extremely irresponsible. The Serbs in the north of Kosovo count fewer than 60,000 souls. To the government in Priština they are insurgents, to NATO a headache they could do without. They are extremely vulnerable. The last thing they need is for the government in Belgrade to undermine them and bolster their tormentor's media offensive against them. The terms Belgrade used to attack them could well have been used to help construct a justification for a crack down.

As it was the emboldened NATO "merely" went for a haphazard attempt at intimidation. Erhard Bühler, the German general who heads the NATO occupation, gleefully announced the border crossing to be within a live-fire zone, where NATO troops would use live ammunition to defend lives, property or the zone itself. In other words NATO was sending a message it would use live ammunition to defend the handful of ugly metal containers that make up the border posts should Serbs again take them to task with a petrol bomb, or a club, or possibly just come near them.

NATO troops also moved against the makeshift roadblocks. Deadlines for their dismantlement were issued with occupiers vowing to dismantle them themselves should they pass unobserved. The Serbs called the occupiers' bluff and they ended up turning back without added incident. Minutes later General Bühler explained the reason NATO did not move to forcefully break up the peaceful roadblocks:

"I had the option to enforce and open up the roadblock. I decided not to do it because in the meantime so many criminals and extremists and armed people are here. It would be a nightmare."

Thank god for the "extremists" then, their presence was the only reason Bühler's storm-troops did not crack down on the "non-extremist" Serbs!

Seeing the government in Belgrade is derelict in its obligation to afford Kosovo Serbs defense, the least it could do is keep its mouth shut when they elect to defend themselves the best way that makes sense to them. Shocking as it may be to quislings deference to power is not a positive value and not laying down before an occupation is not a vice.

A Choice of Scenery

2011-07-27T11:41:00.023+02:00

With famine affecting parts of Somalia, Jeremy Sapienza at antiwar.blog takes time to remind us this is not happening in a vacuum. It is taking place in the context of disruption caused by foreign military activity.

Ethiopia continues to interfere militarily in the border areas of Somalia even after its end of occupation of southern Somalia in 2009. 9,000 African Union troops financed by the United States contest the control of Mogadishu leading to endless battles. Meanwhile direct US involvement consists of regular cruise missile and drone attacks, with secret CIA prisons to go. Additionally Washington will finance any warlord willing to throw his lot with the internationals' clients in the 'Transitional Federal Government'.

This is not the first time there has been a correlation between famine and foreign intervention in Somalia. Twenty years ago an intervention was not one of the causes of malnutrition, but the other way around — famine conditions brought on foreign military adventurism.

On that occasion Americans ended up battling a warlord Mohamed Aideed whom they had initially partnered. Numerous Somalis, combatants and non-combatants alike were killed at the hands of foreign soldiers. Finally, after a media embarrassment in the Black Hawk Down incident Americans hastily withdrew. It was a defeat of American overseas adventurism as clear cut as the fiasco in Lebanon a decade earlier.

The background to what led the United States on this path of failure is an instructive one and comes with an unlikely Balkan connection. The 1992 famine in Somalia provided the backdrop to the intervention, but the desire to provide famine relief fails as a credible cause of intervention. Humanitarian crisis in Somalia was not the only one in Africa at the time and was not necessarily the most severe of them. Additionally 'Operation Restore Hope' was launched only once the worst of the famine was already over and the lot of Somalis was beginning to improve on its own.

The famine in Somalia was not a media-covered event. The coverage of it did not begin in earnest until after 'Restore Hope' was launched in late 1992. The exception was a short burst of reporting in the weeks that followed an American food airlift to Somalia in August. International event the media was concerning itself with instead was the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In the first half of August in particular sensationalistic reports from Bosnia ballooned after a fake "concentration camp" photograph hit the stands.

As numerous liberal elitists hurried to give themselves a moral purpose by embracing the idea there were Slav, East European barbarians on a Nazi-style rampage in Bosnia the Bush administration came under elite pressure to militarily intervene in Bosnia and Herzegovina against the Bosnian-Herzegovian Serbs. Counter-intuitive given that the US had only recently involved itself in the crisis by giving encouragement to the leadership of the Bosnian Muslims to exit Yugoslavia, Bush would not comply.

Stating he was "not going to get bogged down in some guerilla warfare" Bush rejected calls for an American military adventure in the Balkans. With a mind to the 1992 presidential race he sought to neutralize criticism over inaction in relation to Bosnia by organizing a food airlift to Somalia instead. The food airlift came twelve days after the publication of the faux Bosnia death camp photo had invigorated the humanitarian warmongers.

The pressure to intervene in Bosnia and Herzegovina did not subside. Liberal imperialists as well as right-wingers in love with war on general principles worked energetically to create an atmosphere conductive to US militarily involvement in the war in the Balkans. It was an elite effort mobilizing the press, think-tanks, politicians and government bureaucrats.

American involvement in Bosnia could have positives for the Empire. It could tie NATO Europeans closer to the US and demonstrate the capacity and the willingness of the US to continue to interfere militarily in the world even with the end of the Cold War — much as the 1991 war against Iraq had done. Reluctance to intervene in the face of such a strong movement for intervention on the contrary had the effect of making the US look 'irrelevant' — which is to say sober and peaceable. The problem for Bush was that he shared the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that intervention in Bosnia could easily end in a quagmire and that humanitarianists were being irresponsible in calling for it.

Somalia seemed to offer up a decent solution. Desert where Bosnia and Herzegovina is rugged, accessible by sea instead of landlocked, and the scene of a conflict of much lower intensity. At least in relation to Bosnia it was an easy proposition — thought the Americans. An intervention in Somalia could seemingly be carried out with fewer resources and had less chances of going awry.

With Bill Clinton wining the US presidential election of 1992 the hawks on Bosnia were on the ascendancy. In rearguard action US generals reversed their previous assessment on "do-ability" of intervention in Somalia. Previously they were categorically opposed to both intervention in Bosnia and intervention in Somalia. Now they signaled willingness to do the latter, if they would be spared the former.

With the generals on board for a foray into Somalia all was set. In a final act of his presidency Bush could demonstrate US global reach and leadership, without great exertion and without courting disaster. As admiral David E. Jeremiah, the then Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, explained:

"Thirty thousand troops is a pretty heavy deployment. No one thought Somalia was going to be cheap or completely risk free. But Bosnia made it seem as though we could do Somalia with a relatively moderate force….Thirty thousand wouldn't get you a running start in Bosnia."

Of course Somalia would end up throwing a wrench into Washington's illusions. Possibly getting a bloody nose in Somalia was part of the reason why Clinton's subsequent intervention in Bosnia would a strictly air-based and proxy-based affair. Where 25,000 American soldiers landed in Somalia, not one touched ground in Bosnia and Herzegovina until after the war there was over.

This episode of imperial interference demonstrates how truly banal the causes of Washington's military intervention really are. The reason why the US in 1992 intervened in Somalia had nothing to do with Somalia at all. The cause of intervention was that George H. Bush pushed to intervene in Bosnia, but not wanting to, felt he should intervene somewhere else and in his 'brilliance' settled on the Horn of Africa for scenery.

Sources:

Gibbs, David N., First Do No Harm: Humanitarian Intervention and the Destruction of Yugoslavia. Nashville, Vanderbilt University Press, 2009
Western, Jon "Sources of Humanitarian Intervention: Beliefs, Information, and Advocacy in the U.S. Decisions on Somalia and Bosnia." International Security 26.4 (2002): 112-142.

Insurgency USA

2011-07-10T01:53:00.005+02:00

At a time when the United States is maintaining two objectionable occupations in Iraq and Afghanistan, American TV viewers are watching shows that place Americans in situations not unlike those of occupied Iraqis and Afghans.

The US is occupying two countries with a combined population of 60 million people and battling multiple resistance movements in each. Additionally, no less than six different countries (Libya, Somalia, Yemen, Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan) are being sprinkled, or showered, with US bombs and cruise missiles.

Despite that, there are not many works of cinema or television being made that would have Americans or American-like people invade and occupy places, terrorize them from the air or burst into homes at night to drag away fathers and sons. Presumably proof enough that Americans would not find shows like that enjoyable.

The kind of shows American TV viewing public does like have Americans or American-like people standing up against outside aggressors wrecking their lives and homes to wage desperate, but determined and righteous battles of survival and freedom.

The premise of the series Falling Skies, early in its run on TV in America is that there has been a successful alien invasion of Earth. The viewer has the opportunity to follow partisans of the '2nd Massachusetts Regiment' as they try to survive, protect civilians in their midst and fight the alien occupation.

The apocalyptic event in the series The Walking Dead, whose first season has just ended, is a deadly virus that kills millions of people only to bring them back as zombies. The world finds itself overrun by zombies rather than by aliens, but the story works in much the same way. It follows a small group of survivors, a mix of combatants and non-combatants, desperately trying to survive against the zombie tide and looking for a hope of a normal life.

Television series V, whose two season long run recently ended, portrays aliens who come to Earth and purport to be benevolent, but are actually working to subjugate the human kind. The main protagonist of the series finds herself participating in, and eventually leading a resistance movement that springs up against them. Branded terrorists, they carry out attacks against the newcomers to try to thwart their plans in what seems to be a loosing battle.

Slightly older shows in the same mold are the cult classic Jericho (2006-2008) and the enormously successful Battlestar Galactica (2004-2009). In Jericho the USA is paralyzed by an apparent terrorist attack with nuclear weapons. A small town in rural America must overcome a breakdown of production, trade and communication. Utilities are knocked out and medical facilities no longer operate. The town must defy violent 'Ravenwood' mercenaries – a stand in for Blackwater, accommodate refugees, and withstand an attack by a down on its luck neighboring town.

Battlestar Galactica has the human kind decimated in a surprise attack by artificial life forms. Only those aboard space ships when the attack occurs survive. Military and civilian vessels alike gather in a small fleet and try to flee to safety. On the way they must evade and fight off the far more powerful aggressor seemingly bent on their extinction.

The movie Battle: Los Angeles (2011) has the US military fight a desperate battle to evacuate civilians and defend the city of Los Angeles from a shock & awe style invasion by aliens. Terminator Salvation (2009) portrays a resistance movement fighting against an artificial intelligence and its killer machines on behalf of a decimated human kind. Lastly, a remake of Red Dawn itself is scheduled to hit cinemas later this year. This time around the Wolverines are to battle a North Korean occupation.

One thing such works easily deliver is moral clarity. In Battle: Los Angeles before heading into battle a Marine unit the movie follows is given a pep talk by its lieutenant:

"Here is the situation, marines. We are facing an unknown enemy. We don't know how strong their forces, or what they are capable of – but one thing we do know is that we are fighting for our land, our families, our home, our country god dammit!"

It is not a speech that could be credibly delivered by a US lieutenant in a movie set in Afghanistan. The United States is pursing a number of wars that Americans do not know why they are being fought for, but in the TV alternative that has them fighting alien invasions, killer robots, even zombies what Americans are fighting for could not be clearer.

This clarity is the outcome of the fact that for Americans on TV shows the land where the fighting is taking place, is also the place where they live. In the real world however the United States, like the antagonists of such shows, fights exotic peoples in their own, faraway countries. For places on the receiving end of US invasions, blockades and bombing campaigns the United States military is the alien menace of American TV shows.

Faking It

2011-07-08T17:55:00.000+02:00

I figured saying a thing or two on books I read could be another way to liven up the going on here. The first one is going to be Bosnia: Faking Democracy After Dayton by David Chandler which is the last book I read. Not a review, but a summary key things I got out of it and would be useful to remember.

The work is based on author's observation of the first three years (1996-98) of international involvement in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Every single peace plan put forth before the local belligerents in the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina envisaged a role for foreigners in Bosnia and Herzegovina that was incompatible with a fully sovereign and independent state. This was the case even with the very first settlement proposal, which predated the beginning of the war. So at the same time Europeans were giving encouragement to Alija Izetbegović to take BiH out of Yugoslavia and have "independence" they were already seeing themselves as managers of the place. Every subsequent peace plan tended to go further in granting foreigners power over the country.

After the war internationals gradually intensified their grip on Bosnia. The Dayton Agreement, which ended the war, presupposed only a short, one year period of supervision by the internationals in anticipation of the first post-war elections. These were held and observed to be free and fair. Instead of getting out the internationals unilaterally extended their mission for another two years and expanded their powers of regulation in the sphere of economics. The next year they declared their mission was now an indefinite one and their 'High Representative' could exercise absolutist powers.

Chandler explains this was done under the guise of 'democratization', which, other than its etymology, has nothing to do with democracy. The process of 'democratization' took Bosnia and Herzegovina further away from being a democracy as it piled on powers for the unelected colonial officer, the 'High Representative' and subordinated him the actual, elected, representatives.

The language of democratization, it is explained, makes it possible for outside involvement in BiH to appear as idealistic just as it sets up a platform for self-flattery and denigration of Bosnians as less-civilized on the account of their ‘ethnic rivalries'. Unsurprisingly since 'democratization' represents the resurrection of Civilizing Mission style colonialism wrapped in the language of human rights and ethics based foreign policy.

According to Chandler the greatest effect international involvement in Bosnia after Dayton has had was to reorganize international cooperation. It gave a chance to international institutions like NATO, UN, OSCE to transform and re-legitimize themselves. It was the opportunity to do so that was the most fundamental reason why they and powerful Western governments were excited at the prospect of participating in 'democratization' in Bosnia.

The most interesting part of the book deals with criticisms of international involvement in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Aside from official assessment, which is naturally happy with the effort, Chandler identifies two alternative views, the liberal and the conservative assessments, which are critical of it.

In the period observed liberals complained involvement was not heavy handed enough and repeatedly called for an end to elections and imposition of an ‘open-ended occupation’ or a ‘benign colonial regime’ to secure better results. Conservatives argued 'ethnic division' was so pronounced international policies were not going to succeed no matter the effort spent.

Regardless the similarities between the liberal and conservative standpoints are greater than the differences. Neither is in the least bit concerned about the ethical aspects of imposing foreign rule on Bosnia or denying Bosnians their right for self-rule and self-determination. Further, conservatives concede that shaping BiH in the way liberals wish to would be desirable if only it could be accomplished. So in fact they agree outsiders know what would be best for Bosnians and Herzegovians better than they do themselves, the only difference is conservatives do not think that is enough to make a change.

We Kicked ET's Ass!

2011-07-06T23:18:00.010+02:00

It passed by me without notice, but actually two days ago was the 15th anniversary of when we repelled an alien invasion! Good days!

It turns out this date is not just a World holiday, but also a local holiday in the country of United States of America where it marks a beginning of an event called the American Revolution from way back, like even before ABBA.

An interesting essay on this event - Independence Day Propaganda by Anthony Gregory. It tries to highlight some of its less advertised aspects. These include:

'Boston Tea Party' was caused by anger over a reduction in British taxes on East India tea
Colonials resented the fact Britain had lifted its ban on Catholicism in Canada
George Washington worked to have the maximum corporal punishment in the army raised to 500 lashes
Repression against the Loyalists resulted in up to one hundred thousand people (out of a population of 2.4 million) fleeing to Canada
Seeing it as the less immediate threat Indians mainly fought on the side of Britain
At least 20,000 blacks fought for the British, far fewer against them

The piece goes well with the podcast John A. Nagy - Rebellion in the Ranks: Mutinies of the American Revolution (from NYMAS website) which also highlights a side of the conflict that is seldom considered. There is also a video interview with Nagy, but it's done in a boring fashion, so I can't honestly recommend it.

Strawmanning BiH Schools

2011-07-05T16:59:00.012+02:00

Is it a school, or... an ethnic cleansing training camp??

Schools in Bosnia and Herzegovina. It is an obscure topic. Who knows anything about schools in Bosnia and Herzegovina? Who the hell wants to??

And jet they can not go without a mention in the Western press for long. Major news outlets will periodically take time off from reporting on blondes missing in the Bahamas to say things about schools in Bosnia. What about them?

They are segregated abominations, that's what! *Shivers!*

The most recent of such pieces, NYT's Bosniaks and Croats, Divided in Class and at Play starts of with:

"Every morning at the local grade school formerly known as Brotherhood and Unity, the Catholic Croat children head to the right, and the Bosnian Muslims head to the left."

"The Croats study in the school’s cheerful looking main building, which was recently renovated. The Muslims attend class in the crumbling, dingy annex next door."

Why if this isn't Birmingham, 1963 all over again!

Advancing through the article further we get more of what poses as a measure of the place. The school is on the front lines of ethnic divisions and kids get into fights. These people are hateful little bastards, those Croat types especially. They have a local war criminal guy who was convicted in Holland. And they renovated a hotel, and it has spacious hallways.

Renovating

How credible is the article? Well, the "about" section on the website of the elementary school in question, says:

"In August 2009 the search for a concrete solution of this problem was intensified. Consent of the Government and Ministry for a project of restoration of foundations as the first phase of extending the school building was secured."

"In early 2010 an internal and external restoration of foundations of the building was carried out. With this all conditions for extending the building with an additional floor were met."

"We expect the building of a second floor to follow the planned course and that the Government, that is, the Ministry will secure additional means so the project may finally be realized. To this end the necessary paperwork calculating the funds needed has been delivered to the Ministry."

The expectation is for the "crumbling, dingy" annex to be extended with a second floor in the near future. The foundations have already been restored to make the plan feasible and the paperwork filled.

The reporter makes a point of contrasting appearances of the two school buildings, but leaves out the fact the shoddier of the two is about to have mayor work done on it. Suppose mentioning that part would hurt the intro's whole Birmingham, 1963 vibe.

Reality

The article places the 34 "divided" schools in the context of hatred and "ethnic divisions" it highlights. Their proposed unification is put in the context of overcoming hatred.

In reality the "divided" schools are a manifestation of pluralism in a multi-national state. The reason two parallel systems exist is because Croat parents and Muslim parents have different ideas on what their children should be taught. Instead of continuously fighting over what shape a unified curriculum should take there are two curriculums to chose from. So actually "divided" schools serve to ease tension.

An actual problem is that there are not enough of these schools. Choice is confined to areas that were in the war held by Croat forces. These areas saw good rates of return of people expelled in the war. Subsequently Muslim returnees are numerous enough they can not be pushed around and were immediately able to enroll their children to classes with curriculum designed by themselves

The rate of return to areas that were held by Muslim (and Serb) forces has been far lower. Influence of Croat returnees in Muslim dominated areas is marginal. They were not accommodated by being provided a choice, as public schools in Muslim areas carry only one curriculum. Fortunately where demand for an alternative is strong the Roman Catholic Church has stepped in and founded successful private schools to alleviate the problem.

Initially the material conditions for education of children of Muslim returnees were rather poor, and in a few cases, like in the one the NYT article highlights, such conditions endured for much longer than they should have. But surely the greater injustice, and outrage, is that Croats in a similar situation are not provided schools at all, whether housed in "crumbling, dingy" buildings or otherwise.

Background

There are any number of angles Bosnia and Herzegovina can be covered from, but the Western media has been unflinchingly devoted to retelling one and the same story over and over again. It is the report on "ethnic animosity". Bosnia is Western media's go-to place for "ethnic" hatred.

These stories are really feel-good pieces. Their function is enable its readership to feel good about itself on the account of things that are utterly unremarkable. Have you recently been to an ethnic foods restaurant, and you didn't punch the waiter in the nose? Then tap yourself on the back for not being consumed by ethnic hatreds like those primitive people in Bosnia.

Consequence

Peoples of Bosnia and Herzegovina have valid and serious political issues at stake. The politics of the place are heavy on recognizable topics of centralism, federalism, pluralism, unitarism, even national self-determination and anti-colonialism. But because Bosnia is a vehicle for Western self-congratulation the usual approach to deciphering politics is abandoned, replaced by a caricature where everything is simply about hatreds.

Since it is not possible to understand hatreds, indeed no attempt should ever be made to understand them, it is perfectly acceptable, even desirable to be utterly clueless about why this or that group of Bosnians ever wants anything. Also when convenient the striving of any of Bosnia's nationality for any political goal may safely be dismissed as illegitimate produce of irrational hatred.

This is all fine and dandy in itself but a problem arises when Westerners cultivating this willfully ignorant approach to 'understanding' the place then decide to interfere with it.

Belgians Jet

2011-07-03T11:56:00.001+02:00

Belgium of the Balkans

Nine months after elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina stil no government at the level of the central state. Doris Pack can say what she wants but these Balkanites seem to think anything Belgians can pull off, so can they. Fingers crossed they can build on this to make it a full year.

Why Air War Will Fail

2011-06-28T16:18:00.005+02:00

Aerial revolution booster

I've already touched on this, but I can be clearer. NATO's air war in Libya can not but fail. A bombing campaign is as likely to deliver regime change as you are to fell a log with a handheld mixer.

The powers intervening in Libya are demanding Gaddafi's regime dismantle itself. This is a maximalist war aim. Aerial bombardments, as well as bombing campaigns conducted by clandestine terrorists, have succeeded before in extracting limited concessions from a government, but a bombing campaign forcing a capitulation of a regime is unheard of.

Western powers obviously refused to learn the lesson, but their own 1999 adventure over Yugoslavia shows as much. The terms under which the hostilities were concluded was no capitulation of Milošević across the line. Yugoslavia's sovereignty over Kosovo was reaffirmed in the UN, the demand for NATO access to the whole of Yugoslavia was successfully resisted and (needles to say) the government in Belgrade remained in control over the rest of Yugoslav territory.

Not only are the war aims in Libya greater than the demands placed on Belgrade in 1999, but they are public knowledge. In the Kosovo War the western powers kept Annex B to the Rambouillet proposal under wraps and could therefore drop it without this appearing as a defeat for them. This time they can not abandon their openly stated goal of forcing out the regime of Muammar Gaddafi without sacrificing prestige.

Additionally, what success NATO had in 1999 stemmed from the fact it threatened to pulverize the civilian economy of Serbia. The conflict was framed in terms of NATO rushing to save Albanians from the Serbs, destruction wrought upon Serbia therefore did not count for much. Today NATO is allegedly bombing Libya in order to save Libyans from Gaddafi. It is a story ill equipt to survive NATO openly holding hostage the civilian infrastructure of Libya against the regime of Muammar Gaddafi.

The intervening powers may jet have their way, but it will not be because of the air war. This aspect of intervention represents a complete mismatch of means and aims and will suffer a defeat. Arrogance on display in western capitals that sees them refuse drawing lessons from their military interventions means we are unfortunately assured more aggressive wars, but also the satisfaction of seeing the wars go badly for the aggressor.

Nazi Economics

2011-06-25T11:37:00.003+02:00

An old piece from Reason debunking the commonly held myth of Hitler's 1930s economic miracle. In reality Germany under Nazi stewardship was in a bad shape, particularly its agricultural sector. By late 1935 the country was thought to be experiencing a 'provisions crisis' and Nazi officialdom agonized over a decision whether to import raw materials for the rearmament or food.

It is interesting to think how the lebensraum theory was boosted by the failed economic policies of the Nazis. The idea Germany was overpopulated and needed to colonize new ground in the east was made even more attractive once regulation retarded the agriculture and made it produce even less than it otherwise would.

Compartment

2011-06-24T12:22:00.005+02:00

Nebojša Malić at antiwar.com highlights an interesting documentary pointing out the presence of professional color revolutionaries in epicenters of Arab Spring, which indicates a level of American involvement in some of the uprisings. A great deal of the documentary is based on interviews with some of these revolution consultants. They have an incentive to exaggerate their importance for the uprisings, so the extent they are responsible for events that took place is not necessarily as great as they would like us to believe. It is clear, however, they did have a presence and must have influenced events to some extent, whether great or small.

This is not a proof the revolts were a welcome thing as far as the American Empire is concerned. There is far too much evidence that US support for Arab dictators was sincere. My guess would be that the US, like expansive states are want to do, simultaneously conducted two contradictory policies. Eg that it on one hand sincerely backed Mubarak, but on the other trained activist opposition against him through programs like the National Endowment for Democracy. This sounds like clever hedging of bets, but could just as easily be the result of the mess in its large state apparatus.

Cruise Missile Diplomacy

2011-06-23T12:22:00.002+02:00

In an effort to liven up the lately slow going on here I am going to start pointing out articles of interest when I run into them as many blogs do.

An informative piece at counterpunch.org from Franklin C. Spinney. It places the air strikes on Libya in the context of strikes since Operation Deliberate Force over Bosnia and Herzegovina that are an outgrowth of the mindset common with foreign policy bureaucrats that combines the theories of coercive diplomacy and precision strikes. It is traced to the work done by William Perry who went on to become Clinton's Secretary of Defense.

Moreover the recipe is shown to be based on much self-delusion. It was superflous and inconsequential in Bosnia in '95 and failed against Yugoslavia in '99. What should had been a few days of precision bombing was escalated into a war on the whole economy of one country - something that exceeds the parametres of precision guided coercive diplomacy.

Phony Humanitarians

2011-05-24T17:49:00.005+02:00

In relation to the war in Libya we are predictably faced with overwhelming evidence intervention has nothing to do with humanitarian inclinations. The bombing has not improved the humanitarian situation, but made it worse (duh). This on its own could theoretically be put down to incompetence and stupidity rather than a lack of noble intentions. The attitude of intervening states to the humanitarian disaster they magnified, however, gives lie to their claim that attempting to mitigate suffering was why they became involved.

The bombing campaign conducted under the pretense of a "no-fly zone" added to the number of people fleeing just as it put an end to the airlift evacuation making it more difficult for refugees to get to safety. Probably many that would have otherwise not fled or would extricate themselves by air were condemned to desperate alternatives like braving the Mediterranean on overcrowded vessels or crossing the Sahara. The result has been that of people dying from drinking contaminated water or drowning as they try to get away. Associated Press estimated the number of refugee deaths could be in the thousands:

"They are the latest among hundreds, probably thousands, who have died in desperate attempts to get away from the fighting — and escape charges that they were fighting for Gadhafi as foreign mercenaries."

The intervening states are humanitarian enough to rain down bombs, killing children and wrecking schools, but not humanitarian enough to receive the refugees fleeing the fighting and their anti-Gaddafi allies with open arms. The refugees who make it to Italy are being accommodated only begrudgingly and within set quotas. UK, one of the most aggressive when it came to expanding the business of killing people, refuses to accept any at all. Denmark, all the while proudly flying air sorties over Libya, reinstituted border controls defunct since 2001 partially on the back of fears it would be affected by the refugee situation.

Meanwhile a boat carrying people of various African nationalities fleeing Libya was left floating dead in the water for 16 days without any of the NATO vessels in the vicinity responding to its its calls for help. By the time it washed up on the shore most people on board had died from thirst. NATO literally would not give a glass of water to people dying in front of them.

Thank God for a Coincidence!

2011-05-20T15:43:00.001+02:00

What do you know, just as Operation Unified Protector hit its low-point there came a morale booster. News that the ICC was after an arrest warrant for Gaddafi. This is pure coincidence of course.

The same type of coincidence that saw ICTY indict Radovan Karađić in July 1995 just as the groundwork for Operation Deliberate Force was being laid down or Slobodan Milošević in June 1999, in the midst of Operation Allied Force.

Somehow whenever NATO digs out some exotic savages to open fire on, international courts coincidentally take aim at the very same rascals.

Appeasement in Bosnia-Herzegovina

2011-05-18T01:05:00.005+02:00

When Assembly of Republic of Srpska passed the law on Court of BiH referendum the "High Representative" Valentin Inzko turned into a veritable energizer bunny. He demanded the law be revoked, gave the Serb legislators a deadline upon which to do it, threatened sanctions, then hoped away to to tell UN Security Council tall tales about the "worst crisis since war" brought on by the Serbs.

The Serbs shrugged their shoulders, refusing to pay too much attention to him, but let it be known any sanctions applied by Inzko would receive an answer, not elaborating further. The local papers were certain the move in mind was withdrawal from all institutions of the central state, political representatives of the Serbs did not see it fit to contradict them.

Inzko returned from New York, the deadline on his ultimatum came and went and nothing happened. After talking up a storm Inzko did exactly nothing. Instead his boss, Catherine Ashton, EU foreign policy chief, flew in to BiH, sat down with Milorad Dodik and appeased the Serbs.

The Serbs have been promised the Court of BiH will have a proper look in to see to what degree their complaints are warranted, the work on this is to begin June. In return they will put the referendum on hold, pending the outcome of this process, just what Dodik had been offering since the very beginning.

Dodik's party had been talking up the issue of Court of BiH for 3-4 years to no avail. Persistent pointing out of its tyrannical aspects, the retroactive application of penal law, the hijacking of cases from entity courts, the regular and appeals judges being appointed by the same person, made no impression on Western colonials. But what years of playing nice could not do a direct challenge to their authority delivered in a month.

There is a lesson there. The way to deal with imperialists is by flexing muscles, it is what they understand best. Take Catherine Ashton. Just months ago she was busy devising an EU sanctions package to be used on the unruly natives. Fast forward one referendum law later and she is in BiH on urgent business, bypassing and undermining the bellicose "High Representative".

This situation is far from satisfactory, that the EU has any say what shape the courts in Bosnia and Herzegovina take is scandalous. Besides, the West has a very poor record of actually doing what it obliges itself to do. But the internationals being forced into making a concession to the Republic of Srpska is an encouraging first.

Inzko: Bosnia, it is I

2011-05-11T13:27:00.022+02:00

The troublemakers

The BiH melodrama continues as Inzko keeps replaying his lines about a terrible, unprecedented crisis Bosnia and Herzegovina finds itself in, his words faithfully echoed by the Imperial media. His last stage performance took place at the UN Security Council. Russians rained on his parade, but the high profile of the stage provided him the largest echo chamber jet as every English speaking print outlet out there carried his statements.

The "High Representatives" are not exactly known for avoidance of the bombastic and it is no different this time. There was a real crisis in 1999 when the international occupation forcefully dismissed the democratically elected President of Republic of Srpska to clear the path for its protege and golden boy, one Milorad Dodik. There was a real crisis when in 2001 the internationals moved against banks and protesters with armored vehicles and decimated political leadership of the Bosnian-Herzegovian Croats with arbitrary arrests and dismissals.

There is the presence of Salafis, imported to Bosnia in 1990s by Americans, that is a source of intermittent terrorists attacks. Hell, there is a severe crisis now caused by the "High Representative" covering the back of an unlawfully constituted government of what is colloquially referred to as "the Muslim-Croat Federation" without the participation of Croats that anybody votes for.

The referendum law passed by the Assembly of Republic of Srpska on the other hand is emphatically not a crisis. What exactly is critical about a referendum whose outcome is not in the least bit in question? Yes, the Serbs of Bosnia and Herzegovina do not support centralization introduced after the signing of the Dayton Peace Treaty and not foreseen by it, most of it technically unlawful and all of it enacted under severe foreign pressure. Big freaking newsflash!

Now, it is another story if political leaders of the natives finally in some small measure asserting themselves against foreign diktat presents an enormous crisis for the High Representative and the internationalist gang. But the High Representative is not synonymous with Bosnia and Herzegovina, in fact the last time I checked he wasn't even a citizen. His problems are of no concern to the land whatsoever.

The sources of crises in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the last fifteen years have been alien elements, chiefly the Western colonials who easily do more harm their Salafi bomb-planting friends. Standing up to them and throwing them on the defensive, as Dodik has done, is the best thing that can happen for stability of the country. With international tutors scrambling to oppose a challenge to their role, at the very least Bosnia and Herzegovina is gifted a temporary respite.

Rollback in Bosnia-Herzegovina

2011-05-01T11:20:00.006+02:00

Western mainstream press is great for cheering yourself up. With its inclination to paint its adversaries as far more threatening and radical than they really are it frequently portrays a picture that is much more appealing than reality. Take the recent Guardian and Reuters news articles on BiH.

Apparently "Bosnian Serb separatists [are] holding a referendum" on national courts which represents only "the latest of a range of Serb separatist moves in Bosnia". The planned referendum is "a step towards Bosnia's breakup". The Bosnian Serb leader, Milorad Dodik, who "regularly taunts the international envoys" has already pledged "he would not back down". Thus the internationals are "heading for a showdown with Dodik" which is "likely to intensify Bosnia's dangerous drift and paralysis". Ha! Would that only half of that were true.

In reality Dodik has not mentioned secession in years. Even when he did, it was not in terms of his own policy goals, but in the context of what Bosnian-Herzegovian Serbs may be forced to do to should the transfer of powers from Republic of Srpska to the central state not stop. In the current stand-off too he has kept his goals limited and has offered the internationals a clear and easy way out. He will settle for renegotiating the way in which the central state courts operate and for partially reigning them in. This may represent the standing up against foreign overlords on the level that is rarely seen in former Yugoslavia anymore, but is nowhere near the exciting picture Western media paints.

Inzko, the "High Representative", comes off as panicky in the aforementioned reports, but is right on the money when he says:

"Never before has such a referendum been planned. The intention is to roll back all the achievements. It challenges the role of the high representative."

Certainly, the vote on the courts is being presented as a symbolic stand against all such centralizing legislation imposed from the outside. No wonder that Inzko is nervous and feeding the interviewers the "worst crisis since the end of the war" line. That is nonsense, the land is fine, but it is a crisis for the OHR.

On one hand we have an elected local politician already warned it is not out of the question he could be removed (it is a bluff). On the other a foreign appointee with dictatorial powers over land not his own. The motions of one side for a popular referendum (it does not get much more democratic than that), being answered by the other with threats of "sanctions similar to those placed on Robert Mugabe and Muammar Gaddafi."

It sucks to be an international. The moral high ground tends to be quite elusive in such circumstances. Naturally then a direct challenge like this one is unnerving.

The Death of Anti-Americanism

2011-04-30T11:24:00.001+02:00

The defining characteristic of our time is the Empire centered on the United States of America exercising world hegemony. This comes as a grave misfortune for much of the world, but is not something that has been gravely felt in the United States. Between the increasingly out of bounds police, the shameless fleecing of the American people and the rapidly advancing US national security state this looks to be changing. We seem to be moving toward a time when Americans will increasingly have to be seen as fellow sufferers under the Empire.

Guilty Unless Empire's Client in Good Graces

2011-04-29T10:58:00.002+02:00

Not an Empire's client in good graces

The Balkans have, for over a century now, been a place that fires up Western imaginations and does so in a very specific way. The view that once saw the region as one of mustachioed revolutionaries, bomb throwers and brigands has been since updated to one of "ultra-nationalists", ethnic cleansers and gay bashers. The suggestion underlying either image being the love affair with violence and the failure to pay the norms allegedly adhered to in more civilized places the least regard.

Add to this cultural baggage the need of bureaucracies to justify their existence, which in the case of ad hoc tribunals means producing convictions, and it should really not come as a surprise whenever the ICTY chucks another Balkanite to jail. You don't keep a bonanza worth hundreds of millions per annum going for 17 years, by recognizing your prosecutors' consistent failure to present worthwhile evidence.

At the same time the ICTY is not merely a monstrous bureaucracy and a place to act out on cultural cliches, it is also an instrument of Imperial policy. Therefore there exists a special category of Balkanites who are never packed off to dungeons. Whenever a Balkanite becomes a client of the Empire he is magically transformed from his natural, cutthroat state into a hapless victim emphatically worthy of a virtuous Imperial intervention. Empire's Balkan clients are innocent by definition and are granted acquittals or slapped on the wrist. Sometimes the ICTY even helps with the cover up.

Knowing this you could get away with being shocked when the ICTY recently sentenced two Croatian generals to lengthy prison terms. After all, the charges referred to the closing stage of the war between Croatia and Krajina Serbs by which time Croatia had the unapologetic backing of the United States.

That however would mean forgetting the other side of US-Croatian relations. By 1999 Croatia was on the verge of international sanctions, its government was involved in a war of words with the NGOs, the Western press was penning anti-Tuđman axe jobs and the US embassy headed by William Montgomery was helping finance and organize the opposition. The wartime relationship had soured.

Tuđman was an unpleasant, parochial, ideologically driven old man. An authoritarian-leaning president who broke little dissent and inaugurated a minor cult of personality. He was sufficiently protective of his power and image that he resented interference from the outside as much as he resented criticism from bellow. That was not going to be good enough for the Empire.

In December 1999 Tuđman died, weeks later the opposition ran with the parliamentary elections. The US welcomed the changing of the guard, had William Montgomery repeat his performance with the Serbian opposition, snubbed its former partner in death and let Croatia back into the fold. But for Croats there was to be a cost for the flirtation with substantial independence. The Empire having been made to work for the obedience of Zagreb was no longer beholden to the Croatia Tuđman represented. The Hague hunting season was on.

Before Tuđman's corpse had cooled Carla Del Ponte, the chief inquisitor of the ICTY, appeared on TV screens to inform Croats only the death of their head of state had saved him from a war crimes indictment. Soon (for ICTY's bonanza-extending glacial pace) real indictments of Tuđman's generals followed. In this context the sentences are not shocking, even if in the past the Hague had been more lenient.

The only eyebrow raising part of the verdict was ruling the convicted duo guilty on the count of participation in a "joint criminal enterprise". A conviction of which does not require the defendant to have committed a crime or had the knowledge of any as they were being committed. This represents the wholesale criminalization of the Croatian August 1995 offensive by the ICTY, which wouldn't be news, but for the fact it had been carried out with the sanction of the United States.

The USA green lighted, then assisted the operation by passing on intelligence and by disrupting Serb communications. Actually the Brijuni tapes, showcased by the ICTY as its "smoking gun", themselves indicate Tuđman had been given the support of the US to carry out his plans, provided he could accomplish them out inside a window of a few days. One part has Tuđman brief his subordinates:

"We also have the favor of the United States, but to a certain extent, if you gentlemen can execute this in a professional manner, the same way you had carried it out in Western Slavonia within a timeline of a few days, that means mind you, three or four days, to a maximum of eight days, then we can count that also politically, that we will not only not suffer political damage, but that politically we will gain in the world."

The eyebrow raising part is not what the verdict says about Tuđman - having to exorcize the spirits of less than fully obedient clients is a given - but about what it would have to say about Clinton, who provided the operation with crucial diplomatic and useful tactical backing, to be the least bit consistent.

Testing the Waters, Pushing the Limit

2011-04-24T09:11:00.195+02:00

Indian Milorad Dodik

Bosnia and Herzegovina is a land of the ridiculous, but its greatest irony is that its supposed patriots are only too happy to see foreigners exercise power in their country, knowing it will be used only against their unwilling countrymen. That leaves a man who openly states he has not a shred of feeling for BiH to act as its preeminent fighter for independence. Milorad Dodik, the president of the largest political party of the Bosnian-Herzegovian Serbs, initially toed the line and represented a great hope of the outsiders, but has since grown into a dogged anti-colonialist. He has been engaged in a tug-of-war with Bosnia's foreign tutors for several years now.

On his initiative the Assembly of Republic of Srpska recently passed a decision for a popular referendum to be held, asking the populace of Srpska to register their support or their opposition to the legal framework imposed by the High Representative in 2001 that established the Court of BiH and the Prosecutor's Office. Prior to that Bosnia and Herzegovina had no judiciary at the level of the state. Except for the Constitutional Court of BiH all judiciary institutions were found one step down, at the entity level.

The referendum will record overwhelming disagreement with the laws. Dodik vows to use that to pressure for the re-negotiation of the matter. And should that prove impossible, to refuse to comply with the Court in any way, but ask of the Assembly to declare the laws establishing the Court invalid for the territory of Repulic of Srpska. It has all been wrapped in hefty anti-colonialist rhetoric of being fed up with "the tyranny of the International Community". That subversion of the Dayton Peace Treaty and the Constitution by the High Representative must come to an end. That the representatives of the Serb people in Bosnia will no longer be blackmailed into submission or respond to threats.

It is unclear what this will mean in practise seeing the cooperation of Srpska is hardly required for the day to day work of the Court, but it has been more than enough to have every foreigner invested in the colony up in arms about it. From the "HR/EUSR", to EU, to State Department, to PIC, to the ever present evil witch, Doris Pack and a bunch of other nobodies, all have stated their dissatisfaction in excited tones.

It seems a move whose value is mainly symbolic is quite enough to arouse the feeling of insecurity and sow panic among the internationals if it is bold enough to strike at their lack of legitimacy, and denies their right to even have a say in Bosnia in the first place. Their mantra has been that this represents an assault on the Bosnian state. Their only argument that an entity can not make pronouncements on institutions that are found at the state level.

That is true as far as that goes, but what they leave out is that the judiciary was never to be a domain of the central state in the first place. Seeing the closest thing to Bosnia's constitutional convention took place at a US Air Force base in the American Midwest the constitution of BiH bears a resemblance to the Constitution of the United States. Like it, it comes equipt with a provision stating only powers explicitly stated as being in the domain of the central state can indeed be in its domain. Nowhere are judiciary powers mentioned as such. Indeed the central state was without courts until 2001 when the then "High Representative" Wolfgang Petrisch conjured them up.

Since then the state courts have been used as a means of harassment of bothersome, but vulnerable political personalities. It is something the Croats have been the most hard hit by, having both their present and their former most influential political representatives, Dragan Čović and Ante Jelavić, hit with charges of corruption. They, like all other politicians in BiH, are widely seen as being corrupt even by their loyal constituents, but that is not to say the courts are not even more corrupt, or presented a semblance of a case at trial.

The "High Representative" does not lack for his own means of dealing with elected representatives who pose an obstacle, but they are all rather crude. It is more elegant and raises less waves to have local institutions handle such matters. These native institutions however include in their ranks foreign judges and prosecutors appointed by the "High Representative". It is the height of sophistry to declare combating a courts system under which a citizen of Bosnia and Herzegovina may, in his own land, be prosecuted by one foreigner and sentenced by another as any kind of attack on BiH.

The opposition to the Court of BiH rather represents a fight back against the project central to the internationals' civilising mission: enacting centralisation at all costs, beating into submission those who stand in the way. Like its Constitution the process of its subversion in BiH bears a superficial resemblance to the gradual centralisation in the United States, but it is in fact much more serious.

Firstly it has been more rapid. Next it is being brought on by outside interference, not an internal driving force. Lastly it is usurping the legal framework that is not just the fundamental law of the land, but an actual peace treaty that ended a civil war. Messing with the constitutional order is bad enough, usurping a peace treaty is downright insane.

This Is No Rebel Alliance

2011-04-15T01:36:00.011+02:00

A galaxy far away

The Libyan opposition declined to consider a peace proposal made by the African Union because it did not fulfill all of their demands. Before that they were outraged with Turkey for just considering proposing a peace plan. Judging by this reaction one would think they are riding atop armoured columns converging on Gaddafi's tent from all directions. Instead they are a rag-tag bunch with no hope of unseating Gaddafi on their own and are slowly ceding ground to him even with the help of NATO air cover.

An absurd situation on the face of it, but not truly. As I have written interventionism changes the dynamics of the war with which it interferes:

"The group on whose behalf intervention has been launched receives incentives to refuse to settle for terms they might have settled for before the intervention; they are now incentivized to hold out for a better deal secured by the might of the intervening power. This prolongs the crisis."

Therefore this sort of stance on the part of the rebels in Libya could be predicted, but the level of hypocrisy it has been packaged in is disturbing. The rebels will not stop talking about the need to protect civilians, but if that were their main concern they would have immediately accepted the cease fire on offer. The longer the fighting lasts the more civilians are going to be killed. Obviously their main concern are their war aims, and not the civilians.

As Daniel Larison noted they went so far as to chase away a Turkish humanitarian ship. This makes sense, the graver the humanitarian crisis the louder the calls to "do more". But how does that work into their supposed concern for civilians? Or their statement, highlighted by Pepe Escobar, that things were better for civilians when the US was more involved and the bombing was more intense? That takes real cynicism.

Question is are the rebels, who are throwing a fit over their country not being bombed more intensely, really the representatives of the masses that turned up for the giant anti-government demonstrations in February? Reportedly those demonstrations were huge, jet the rebels are few. Most Libyans seem to be standing aside, acting as if they do not have a horse in the race. And why wouldn't they? Has anyone explained what makes Abdel Fattah Younis preferable to Muammar Gaddafi?

Weakness or Cunning?

2011-04-14T02:24:00.011+02:00

In the Anglo-Zulu War of 1879 the Zulus at the Battle of Isandlwana handed the British a humiliating defeat by annihilating the main body of the British invasion force. The outcome of the battle won the Zulus undying glory just as it spelt doom for the Zulu Empire. Having suffered such a blow to its prestige, London upgraded the importance of the war in its schemes and resolved to invest as much resources into the fight as needed to prevail and restore its standing. Thus the very decisiveness of the victory of the Zulus at Isandlwana in the end worked to the detriment of their ultimate war aims.

In the present day, in Libya, there seems to be little danger of a decisive battle or of anything else particularly dramatic. For a while now the fighting has consisted of miniscule and rag-tag opposition forces slowly ceding ground to equally puny government forces. As Patrick Buchanan has noted this has so far been a conflict in which eight people killed constitute "heavy fighting".

Question is, is Gaddafi indeed so weak that he can not quickly and decisively beat the opposition? Or is he purposely choosing to fight with one hand tied behind his back? It would make certain sense for him to do so. Anything dramatic would get TV play and increase the media profile of the war. This in turn would increase the amount of prestige at stake in its outcome, making it more important for the intervening powers to see him overthrown. Keeping the war boring however helps war fatigue set in, making it more difficult for advocates of increased foreign involvement to get their way, all the while his forces slowly advance.

Mutual Frustrations

2011-04-12T06:35:00.010+02:00

Advancing in the wrong direction

The Libyan opposition has been voicing its frustration with NATO for unloading an insufficient tonnage of bombs, though the bombs that were unloaded were quite sufficient to kill civilians, children included, and opposition fighters themselves. Meanwhile intervening powers are no doubt equally frustrated with the opposition seeing it has been losing ground to the government which now looks well positioned to advance on Benghazi. A defeat of their clients would deal a blow to the prestige of the intervening powers.

Opposition fighters are not terribly accomplished at waging war to say the least, but more than that they have very little incentive to become better. The most straightforward way for them to win is to secure for themselves a still wider foreign intervention and have NATO do their fighting for them. In bringing about this goal loosing ground is much more useful than gaining ground, since it brings pressure on the foreigners to "do something" to change the situation. Still greater amount of pressure is brought to bear by playing up the extent of civilian suffering caused by government forces (the suffering caused by themselves and NATO is naturally ignored) and accusing foreign powers of a lack of empathy.

NATO for its part has for the umpteenth time demonstrated its impotence. The government forces quickly adapted to the new realities, switching dated tanks for technicals and unmarked cars making themselves difficult to readily distinguish from the opposing forces, and are now once more giving chase to the opposition. At the end of the day the air force is little more than a rich man's car bomb. It can destroy, kill, wreak havoc, but it can not sweep away the enemy and it is never certain it can compel it to capitulate. The idea regime change can be accomplished from the air is about as credible as the idea a revolution can be brought about by bombs planted by terrorists.

Certainly it is within NATO's ability to unseat Gaddafi, but not without risking casualties of its own - something it is historically extremely loathe to do. Killing for "humanitarian" purposes, has always held more allure for NATO forces than dying for them. In 1995 in Bosnia a workaround existed, Croatian Army could be made to intervene against the Bosnian Serbs on the behalf of the Sarajevo government. Thanks to media demonisation of the Serbs, during the 1999 bombing of Yugoslavia NATO could get away with going after civilian targets. This time given that Libyan opposition does not seem to be up to the task and that intervention has been ostensibly launched on behalf of the long oppressed Libyan people, rather than against it, it is a different story.

Brussels vs Moscow

2011-04-06T01:05:00.009+02:00

The EU created the legal framework needed to slap sanctions on Bosnian-Herzegovian politicians of its choice that Ashton was going on about way back in January. You have to love a EU documet which states measures should be imposed against "natural and legal persons whose activities undermine the sovereignty, territorial integrity, constitutional order and international personality of Bosnia and Herzegovina".

The EU which occupies Bosnia and Herzegovina, holds it in a quasi-colonial status and which just threw its full weight behind the High Representative's legalisation of a Federation government that failed to secure one third Croat support demanded by the Constitution is making it know it is getting ready to crack down on persons who undermine the sovereignty, constitutional order and international personality of Bosnia and Herzegovina. It is a level of double-speak that would have Stalin blush.

This step is a theatrical move conceived in the heads of frustrated and unimaginative Brussels apparatchiks that will not have any effect on the ground. Brussels is already able to impose far more potent punitive measures indirectly via the High Representative in Sarajevo. However it serves to illustrate the marks of EU's involvement in the Balkans - hunger for control, reliance on threats and a penchant for blacklisting.

Undoubtedly some of that stems from the characteristic contempt of bureaucrats for anyone unlucky enough to be in the range of their clutches. But aside from that what we are seeing is also the result of a cultural disposition. It is an inescapable fact that we are seeing a Western institution adopt a domineering and disdainful tone in relation to the functionaries of a Balkan state. Does anyone believe the EU could get away with this sort of posture if we were talking about Norway rather than Bosnia?

Meanwhile Russian ambassador Bocan-Harchenko has stated and restated Russia's disagreement with the recent interference of the High Representative and added that the crisis should have been left to local institutions. He has once again said Russia supports the wrapping up of the supervisory regime of the Peace Implementation Council. No threats, no sanctions, no promises of blacklists. Here is a country that actually understands the meaning of sovereignty, constitutional order and independence.

At the end of the day it is illusory to expect Russia will be spending a great deal of its resources to try to accomplish the disengagement of the PIC. It is better off pursuing foreign policy goals closer to home, which are more easily attainable and may benefit it directly rather than pointlessly locking swords over Bosnia. Still it is always good to see there are non-hypocritical actors out there on the international arena. Then again Russia always was better on the Balkans than Western Europe.

The Logic of Humanitarian Warfare

2011-04-05T10:59:00.000+02:00

Mises.org published an article of mine that is a theoretical look at predictable effects of humanitarian interventionism. This way to read it.

A Permanent Type of Temporary

2011-04-04T01:45:00.006+02:00

Bosnia and Herzegovina is a land of dystopian absurdities. It boasts a UN seat though it is under the formal dictatorship of a colonial overseer. It participates in the occupation of Afghanistan though it is itself occupied. It is said to be a democracy though any elected official may at any time be ejected from his office and be barred from ever running in an election again. It boasts one constitutional court which makes decisions by a simple majority though its complement of judges is only two thirds filled, another constitutional court of whose nine judges, three are foreigners and appointed by a foreign institution. It has in Washington and Brussels a protector of its sovereignty and independence that occupy it, threaten its officials, sideline its institutions and write its laws for it.

Last week the High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina suspended the ruling of the country's Central Election Commission and in phrasing his decree made sure to point out this was a temporary suspension passed for the purpose of giving the Constitutional Court of the Federation "the opportunity to pronounce itself on these issues" .

The Constitutional Court was to respond to a demand for the appraisal of constitutionality submitted by the president of the Federation installed by the last lawfully constituted House of Peoples, a Croat, Borjana Krišto. Seeing the Court was bent on handling the issue at a closed session and without her presence, to which the complainant is by law entitled, she withdrew her demand. Without her complaint there is nothing for the Court to rule on, thus the rationale given by the High Representative to suspend the ruling of the CEC is made nonsensical.

Regardless, this being Bosnia and Herzegovina the decision remains in place until the foreign rulers decide otherwise, which they have made clear they have no intention of doing. A decree which in anticipation of a ruling by the Constitutional Court which is never going to materialise and for the sake of "legal clarity" temporarily suspends the decision of a body, which actually is competent to make them, is made permanent.

In the twilight zone that is the neo-colonial Bosnia and Herzegovina "temporary" just doesn't have the same temporariness about it.

Congrats!

2011-04-03T12:45:00.009+02:00

On October 3rd a general election was held in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Today, six months later, there is still no government in place at the highest, state level of power. (Along with there being an unconstitutional government at the entity level.) Not exactly world record since Iraq spent 10 months in a post-election deadlock in 2010, and Belgium - without a government since election in June - is also at 10 months. Still, half a year is no everyday accomplishment and so congratulations are in order.

Human Sacrifice

2011-03-31T00:20:00.018+02:00

"The Libya intervention is legal and was necessary to prevent further massacres and to forestall a threat to democratization in Tunisia and Egypt, and if it succeeds in getting rid of Qaddafi’s murderous regime and allowing Libyans to have a normal life, it will be worth the sacrifices in life and treasure. If NATO needs me, I’m there."

So writes Juan Cole "one of the left's leading advocates of American involvement in the war in Libya". There you go. The goal of Juan Cole is worth the sacrifices in life and treasure.

The goal of Muammar Gaddafi to keep himself in power is not worth it. Therefore when ole Muammar kills people it is called a massacre. When USAF kills people it is not a massacre being that Juan Cole's goal of installing the opposition in Gaddafi's place is on the contrary worth it. It is all about who has a worthy goal. If you have a worthy goal, then it is OK to kill Libyans.

Gaddafi's goal is not worthy because it is selfish. He wishes only to stay in power. Cole's goal on the other hand is not selfish. He only wishes for liberals such as himself to be once more able to feel good about their government.

Of course that may take some sacrifice on the part of a certain number of 20-year old conscripts, stay-at-home moms and schoolchildren to be blown up by NATO. But at least they will be massacred for a cause that is worthy. Imagine if they were instead sacrificed by Gaddafi for the sake of his staying in power. Terrible!

The problem with "absolute anti-imperialists" is they don't understand how worthy a goal of making liberals feel good about themselves really is. Forestalling a phony threat to democratisation in Tunisia and Egypt? Why that alone has to be worth 10,000 maybe 50,000 dead Libyans!

And don't worry ye mothers who will be collecting scraps of your children to give them the semblance of a burial. Juan Cole is no hypocrite. Why, he is standing by, willing to enlist himself to help NATO drop bombs on you. Are you not happy? Juan Cole will personally make sure you or your children get killed for all the right reasons!

Now, now do not start with any of that individual choice stuff, none of how the freedom under the benevolent rule of a French-puppet government does not mean much if your baby boy is dead and how maybe you prefer Gaddafi to uncertainties of a civil war. Juan Cole is progressive and an American which means it is alright for him to make the decision for you. You will thank him in the end when you see how good it made him feel, I'm sure.

The Age of Colonialism

2011-03-29T21:24:00.023+02:00

The High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina has once more blatantly intruded in the work of institutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina. This time he has resorted to the use of the so called Bonn Powers in order to suspend the Decision of the Central Election Commission that ruled the constituent session of a rump upper house of the parliament of the Federation unlawful being in violation of the country's Election Law.

The "Bonn Powers", it should be remembered, were not envisioned by the original peace settlements signed by the warring sides that created the Office of the High Representative, but were imposed on Bosnians and Herzegovians a year and a half later by outsiders who had set themselves up as overbearing and unwelcome tutors.

The decree additionally orders state officials to obey the self-proclaimed executive authorities and validates its acts, until the Constitutional Court of the Federation rules on the matter of their seizure of power. This upholds the power grab of the SDP-SDA coalition for now, but more than that in Bosnia and Herzegovina the decisions of Constitutional Courts are themselves frequently a sham. Though it is hard to see how could it do so this time, most expect the Constitutional Court to make the ruling the foreigners want them to. The US ambassador to Bosnia and Herzegovina, Patrick Moon had paid a visit to the court only recently, and the US Embassy certainly wasted no time in issuing a statement hailing the decree.

Subsequently Dragan Čović, the head of the largest Croatian party, had no doubts who was behind it:

"The fact is that such a decision can not be made without the administration of the USA. Up until now we have been talking about this group of people [gathered around SDP] having covert backing from someone powerful from the international community in hushed tones, but now we can openly state the OHR would not have passed such a decision, if it did not have the backing of those who have the power to define these type of decisions."

Nine Croat parties, parliamentary as well as non-parliamentary, issued a joint statement protesting the decision, noting it was part of a long lasting trend toward marginalisation of the least numerous nationality of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Meanwhile Milorad Dodik, the president of Republic of Srpska opined that by suspending the decision of the Central Election Commission the OHR had in fact "suspended the little bit of credibility the international community had in BiH".

The High Representative explained his move in terms of the need for "legal clarity" as if his assault on local institutions was not the mayor destabilising factor in the equation and his rule by decree the opposite of any worthwhile legal norms. The continued interference of foreign actors has been the single biggest cause of uncertainties and complexities built in into the way in which the legal-political system in place in Bosnia and Herzegovina operates.

The text of the decree states it is not aimed at undermining the Central Election Commission ("The Decision to suspend the CEC’s decision in no way suggests a lack of confidence by the international community in the CEC.") precisely as it marginalises it and sweeps it out of the way. The will of a single functionary, who has not been elected by anyone, is not even a citizen of Bosnia and Herzegovina is embedded with more power than the decision of a lawful local institution.

Colonialism is an idea that has been utterly discredited, not the least by the experience of Bosnia and Herzegovina under colonial rule in the 1878-1918 period. A question needs to be raised regarding the legitimacy of the resurrection of colonial practises on the backs of the peoples of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The practises which Western powers had supposedly repudiated and now regret.

The present political and institutional crisis in which the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina finds itself is severe, but more than that the whole experience of neo-colonial Bosnia and Herzegovina has been that of a continuous crisis. Everything in Bosnia has a transitional, provisional feel about it, the only certainty being the certainty of gridlocks, quandaries, pressures, threats, dismissals... This is a predictable outcome of foreign actors consistently backing and clearing the path for a rather radical political option whose programme of centralising Bosnia and Herzegovina as much as humanly possible is utterly opposed by the majority of the country's population.

What will it take for these new colonialist, these new proponents of civilising missions and practitioners of politics of divide and rule to leave and stop turning up the heat of the politics in Bosnia and Herzegovina?

A War Without War Aims

2011-03-26T13:21:00.001+01:00

The war begun by the intervening powers in Libya is another of those wars launched for no other reason than to make the attackers look good. After the French, in a midst of an election campaign, jumped headlong into a new adventure the US could not stay behind but hurried to put itself at the forefront lest the French grab all the limelight and start getting ideas above their station.

Fittingly the first war launched by Barrack Obama, the image president of the United States, is an image war. It shows the absurd nature of the time we live in, when ruling politicians will start needless wars with the expectation that it will improve their PR.

It has been interesting to observe Western officials who having sobered up from the initial bombing binge become self-conscious of the absurdity of their enterprise and sought to reassure the public by explaining they will not seek an escalation, because actually their war has no war aims. It is certainly not aimed at overthrowing Gaddafi the public has been told.

This might even be their sincere opinion right now that they have become conscious of the difficulties involved, but experience tells us this is poppycock. Sooner or later Western officials will start explaining that by starting the action, which was clearly anti-Gaddafi in nature, they had put their "credibility" on the line and therefore must bring it to an end by achieving a clear victory over him. There is a high likelihood of the intervening powers gradually investing more in the outcome of the competition for power in Libya, albeit it might not become apparent fast.

Irish Rebel Music

2011-03-21T15:03:00.019+01:00

In the British-Irish conflict in Northern Ireland we have a semi-recent guerilla war where the guerrillas spoke English. This presents an opportunity to easily study guerrilla and eliminates many of the excuses for not understanding it. The studying does not even have to consist of heavy reading. Plenty can be gained by just listening to melodic three chords string music. I am proposing the idea that almost anyone can advance his understanding of determined guerrillas anywhere by examining Irish Rebel Music. It would be silly to claim to know what were the musical tastes of actual PIRA guerrillas, but it is safe to say the part of the populace that supported them, and therefore represented its recruitment pool, had a place for this kind of music.

A good approach to studying it might be to analyse its recurring themes. According to the themes the songs can be seemingly divided into half a dozen basic categories.

The windup song: Kinky Boots, Reverend Ian, Fenian Record Player

The celebration song: One Shot Paddy , The Helicopter Song, The Armagh Sniper

The defiance song: Tiocfaidh ar la, Fighting men of Crossmaghlen, The Decomission song, Go On Home British Soldiers

The grievance song: The Men Behind the Wire , Irish Republican Jail Song , Aidan Mcanaspie

The history song: Let the People Sing, The Wearing of the Green, Irish Soldier Laddie, Boys of the Old Brigade, Boys from County Cork

The martyr song: Shaun South of Garryowen, Ballad of Billy Reid, Hughes Lives On

Naturally there is overlap and a few songs defy such straightforward categorisation utterly, for example: Going Home at Last, My Little Armalite and Auf Wiedersehen to Crossmaghlen. Still it is possible to identify the largest overlap groups as:

The history/marty song: Kevin Barry, Erin Go Bragh

The history/defiance song: Broad Black Brimmer, You'll Never Beat the Irish, Ireland Unfree, Freedom's Sons, By the Rising of the Moon

The martyr/grievance song: Roll of Honour, The Ballad of Gerard Casey, Eddie Fulton, Ambush at Clonoe, Shoot to Kill, Men of '81, The Ambush at Drumnakilly, The Ballad of Bobby Sands, The Loughall Ambush

What can be reasonably deduced examining these categories?

It would probably be a mistake to over analyse the windup songs. They show humour endures in the worst of circumstances, but before that they are an attempt to sting the enemy, to get at him even if just with a song.

The notable thing about the celebration songs is that there are not many of them. Also they celebrate achievements which in the context of a war as a whole are not of any grand importance. If a guerrilla movement needs victories to sustain itself then it only needs minor victories of the sort which is impossible to deny to it.

The defiance songs set their mind on the final outcome, they convey the mind-set of people so hard hit they are willing to endure the security countermeasures. The songs themselves do not convey a different sort of message than your average Twisted Sister rock anthem, only here you come away with the feeling they mean it. It is certainly not an everyday type of sentiment, but one rather extraordinary.

The grievance song category is somewhat lacking in the Irish Rebel Music, perhaps on the account of the British not treating the Irish during the Troubles as badly as they could have, certainly not as bad as in the 1919-21 war. Mayhap they lacked material. Whichever way, where there is a grievance there is not a call for solidarity far behind.

Heedless of the crying children
Dragging fathers from their beds
Beating sons while helpless mothers
Watched the blood poor from their heads

Proud we march behind our banner
Firm we´ll stand behind our men
We will have them free to help us
Build a nation once again

An indication the best way to drive a population to support the guerrillas is by mistreating them.

The history songs appear to be less edgy and warlike. History is mined for that which can be held up as an example to follow, which in the Irish case are all the more compelling since their current and their historical opponent are one and the same, but there is nothing that would show collective memory is the actual cause of conflict or the immediate motivation of the fighters. They become potent only in crossover when an event is mined that is an example of defiance or martyrdom.

The thing most notable about the martyr song category, is that it exists at all. It is not a theme for other types of music, except in church music but not in this type of bleak, dead-end feel. There are no conventional hero songs. All the heroes are dead. But the dead are remembered, revered and live for ever ("Hughes Lives On"). The martyr songs are also one of the most drenched in emotion. Martyrs are an enormous boon to determination and recruitment. Who will allow the self-sacrifice of men of such calibre to have been for nought?

The important and correspondingly large is the overlap of the martyr/grievance themes. A reminder that every martyr is by necessity also a grievance. In normal time a people is not producing martyrs. If it is then that is a sign of something being wrong right there. On top of that if the populace identifies the guerrillas as "our young lads" or something along those lines then their deaths can amount to a grievance, even if they do not support their means or even their political goals. This support increases exponentially if there is a feeling "the lads" were killed by an enemy that is overly aggressive.

Consider the multitude of grievance/martyr songs about IRA men killed under the "shoot to kill" policy. Not giving an enemy soldier the chance to surrender is a crime, but much lesser than other crimes that happen in war. Jet the grievance is great. Because to the populace these are not clashes pitting faceless soldiers against other faceless soldiers. They amount to situations where local lads are being mercilessly gunned down by professional special forces types and dogs of war. There is no contradiction to a populace feeling itself oppressed between a fighter being simultaneously a "bold volunteer" of the "proud IRA", defying the whole might of the British Empire and being a 20 year old lad with no military training that does not deserve to be preyed upon in an ambush by one of world's better equipt and trained special operations units and then not given a chance to lay down his firearm before he is shot in the head. Not merely mistreating the populace, merely going after the combatants in an offensive operation can, and likely will be counter-productive.

So much for this type of analysis for what it's worth. The conventional way is to examine the specific things the lyrics tell us – if we chose to believe them:

Why they join:

They told me how Connolly was shot in his chair,
His wounds from the fighting all bloody and bare.
His fine body twisted, all battered and lame
They soon made me part of the patriot game.
It's nearly two years since I wandered away
With the local battalion of the bold IRA,
For I read of our heroes, and wanted the same
To play out my part in the patriot game.

How they adapt:

I was stopped by a soldier, said he, You are a swine,
He beat me with his baton and he kicked me in the groin,
I bowed and I scraped, sure me manners were polite
But all the time I'm thinking of me little Armalite.

What they plan:

When I grow up and marry, I'll have a little son
I'll tell him about the regiment and the terrible things they've done
And when he gets older, becomes a man like me
He'll become a volunteer and set old Ireland free

How determined they are:

Oh England do you really think its over
If you do you're going to have to kill us all
For until you take your murderers out of Ireland
Then we will make them rue the blood spill at Loughgall

What time means to them:

Go on home British soldiers go on home
have you got no fuck'in homes of your own
for eight hundred years we've fought you without fear
and we will fight you for eight hundred more.

What does it take to be a hero:

In a Belfast bakery in the August of the year,
When internment was imposed throughout the land
Six volunteers from Belfast held six hundred troops at bay
And their leader was Joe McCann, Joe McCann,
The Leader was Joe McCann, Joe McCann.

How they generally end:

While returning the guns Billy met British Huns
And when the fight had begun
His position was dire when his gun wouldn't fire
So he died with that old Thompson gun.

Allthough he lay dead he was kicked in the head,
By the hair they dragged him around.
But the still fear him yet and we can never forget,
How brave Billy Reid stood his ground.

Where they come from:

In their boyhood years these lads learned at first hand:
They were only second class in their own land,
Stopped and searched by police each time they walked the streets
And degraded by each foot-patrol they'd meet
To those RUC and soldiers it was fun,
To intimidate our children with their guns
But there's some young folk who won't take any more
And there's some who want to even up the score

What happens to them because of the occupier:

There is a lovely graveyard not far from their homes,
And thats the final resting place for these lads from West Tyrone
They have gone to join their comrades; Harvey, Devlin, McGlynn and Tone.
May God be with you always the lads from West Tyrone.

The fate in store for the occupier for it:

The British scum,
They do fear,
Never again they'll see their cursed shore.
Because they know
They'll pay dear,
And the RA will even Ireland's bloody score.

Of those not to be be forgoten:

In those dreary H-Block cages ten brave young Irishmen lay
Hungering for justice as their young lives ebbed away,
For their rights as Irish soldiers and to free their native land
They stood beside their leader - the gallant Bobby Sands.
Read the roll of honour for Ireland's bravest men
We must be united in memory of the ten,
England you're a monster, don't think that you have won
We will never be defeated while Ireland has such sons.

And of that not to be forgoten:

And cruel British assassins in the cover of dark,
Headed for Rasharkin, onto Shamrock Park,
With their guns of terror they burst down the door,
And the cowards went looking for for the family man of four,
The found him with his wife and baby girl in bed,
They sprayed English bullets and left Gerard Casey dead,
The cowards had fled - the sadness that night,
For his wife and young family would carry on the fight.

Once again black flags are hoisted in the county of Tyrone
Three more good men lie butchered by the forces of the crown
We shed tears of grief and anger as the news spreads quickly round
How the SAS had waited and without warning gunned them down.

On the road past Drumnakilly sorrow shrouds thae roadway still
There the Sas men lay in ambush to do Maggie Thatchers will
Like Loughall and like Gibralter British justice has no frills
They came to Tyrone for vengeance and their orders were to kill.

Coverage and The Lack of Thereof

2011-03-20T17:21:00.002+01:00

Here to read a contribution for a "News in English" section of a news portal from Herzegovina, poskok.info, penned by me.

A Coup d'Etat

2011-03-19T11:16:00.013+01:00

In Bosnia and Herzegovina the SDP-SDA coalition held what it deemed a constituent session of the House of Peoples of the Federation which then supposedly confirmed the new government of the Federation. Trouble is the Central Electoral Commission of BiH has stated unequivocally that such a move before all delegates for the House have been certified by the Commission would be unconstitutional. The delegates from the Croatian-majority cantons of the Federation how not jet been elected - due to Croat obstruction in protest of the plans of the SDP to sideline them - and thus can not be certified. Only 33 delegates were in attendance, though the House has 58 seats. Indeed this is a technicality, but technicalities are the bread and butter of law.

The disregard for the Constitution did not end here however. By law a government needs not only be confirmed by a validly constituted House of Peoples, such a mandate requires at least one third support from the Croat members of the House. Since the House reserves 17 seats for Croats this means 6 votes. The SDP-SDA received only 5 (from the Croats elected in majority-Muslim cantons who are members of Muslim parties), but absurdly claimed this was sufficient since it represented more than a third of the representatives in attendance. Put otherwise, the self-proclaimed new government of the Federation is doubly illegal.

The Croat parties have declared they do not recognise this government, which means the Croat-majority cantons will neither. Various Croat office holders installed by the previous parliament or government have declared their intention to refuse to vacate them. The largest Bosnian Serb party, the SNSD, has declared this move by the SDP and SDA makes any coalition with them on the central state level impossible, which means there will be no government formed on the state level for the foreseeable future. The Croats have already staged protest rallies in a number of towns on Thursday, though they were rather small on the account of the short notice. More are expected in the future.

Lest the SDP and SDA retract, eg by acquiescing to repeat elections, it is not out of the question Croat-majority cantons and municipalities will link themselves in some way, paving a way for a de facto Croatian autonomous unit. That is certainly the wish of the Croat voters in Bosnia and Herzegovina, it remains to be seen if their politicians have the guile to take up the challenge. A situation where five and a half months after the elections the government had not jet been formed was deemed an "impasse" and a cause of "deep concern" for both Brussels and Washington, but after this escalation it is now a real crisis. It is certainly not the end of things, as the present situation is unsustainable and calls for a resolution.

This is the largest crisis in the Federation since 2001 when a Croat declaration of self-administration was answered by a forceful crackdown by SFOR. Nowadays however the EUFOR occupation force numbers a paltry 1,600 troops from 26 different nations. This time around, however else it ends, it does not end with the foreigners rolling down the streets of western Mostar.

Brecher

2011-03-18T21:52:00.007+01:00

Gary Brecher or The War Nerd made famous by The Exile strikes again this time over at The American Conservative.

I like Brecher (Dolan) as a writer, he has a way with words and is very enjoyable to read. But I’d have my head examined if I let what he writes greatly shape my opinion on the real world out there.

He mixes a few common sense points with copious amounts of pure fantasy. With the matter-of-fact tone he employs and the random bits of information he throws out there it is easy to come to think he know just about all there is to know about the various obscure conflicts he mentions in his pieces.

But if his knowledge of the Balkans is an indication of the rest of it, this is not so much real knowledge as it is a mix of the absolute crudest form of stereotyping, misheard tidbits of information and literary inventions thrown in for their effect.

In the context of the Kosovo War the article speaks of a "Serb militia" fighting alongside the police, "the gullible Beltway pundit crowd" falling for an Albanian trick and KLA's "connections with al-Qaeda". In reality the KLA was given battle by the Priština Corps of the 3rd Army (Armija) of the Army (Vojska) of Yugoslavia, not militiamen. The Westerners were not "duped" by the Račak 'massacre', they helped with the performance. And the KLA is many things, but pro-Al Quada is not one of them.

Then there are the sweeping statements about the nature of warfare in the Balkans. Apparently it can all be subsumed under "tribes" running around massacring each other since times immemorial. How unusual, a Westerner letting his imagination run loose in the Balkans.

Lastly, regardless of Brecher's flair for the outrageous he is unable to challenge the official wisdom regarding the Serbs without inserting a qualifying statement first: "Now, I have no trouble with the Serbs as fairly bad guys when provoked..." Brecher has in the past sang unqualified praises of Genghis Khan, Tamerlane, the Tutsis and the Turks. But tackling the Balkans without a qualifying statement about the Serbs is out of his comfort zone.

Brecher puts creating literature above writing punditry. He is best read that way too.

The 'Deeply Concerned' Brussels

2011-03-18T13:41:00.009+01:00

Well what do you know, aside from the US, the EU is likewise "deeply concerned" about the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina. And like Washington, it knows just what the natives ought to do:

"Bosnia and Herzegovina cannot afford to lose more time. The political leaders must urgently address EU-related reforms as a matter of priority if the country is to take steps forward on its European integration path. For this to happen, Bosnia and Herzegovina needs representative, broad and solid governments at all levels to tackle the outstanding issues in this regard."

There you go, the institution that can talk about the "office of HR/EUSR" with a straight face and which has a "High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice-President of the Commission" (HRUFASP?) knows just what the bureaucracy-stricken Bosnia needs to pulls itself together.

There is a lesson in there somewhere for libertarians. Here is the colonial power that is the EU growing frustrated with the fact there is no government in Bosnia and Herzegovina in place jet. (Aside from the government in Republic of Srpska which they detest.) Without middlemen it is impossible for them to exercise power in the Condominium and they are left utterly hapless. There is no one to implement their dictates.

Here then is to hoping the present situation lasts and the EU grows even more concerned. Maybe they'll give it up and get a hobby.

A Delicacy From the Washington Kitchen

2011-03-17T14:05:00.004+01:00

The talks on Federation government formation sponsored by the "High Representative" break down. The OHR reportedly accuses Croats of obstruction. The Croats announce intention to stage protests. The Muslims declare they will immediately commence formation of the government without the Croats. The Serbs vow to support the Croats and not work with forces that would form such a government. Oh yes, it's another day in the Protectorate.

Schwarz-Schilling Credist Himself With Preventing a War

2011-03-14T11:55:00.031+01:00

In 2006 and 2007 there was talk of finally closing the Office of the High Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina. A German, Christian Schwarz-Schilling was to be fifth and last "High Representative". It did not happen, after the 5th there was the 6th and then the 7th "High Representative". To anyone familiar with either bureaucratic inertia or West European addiction to meddling in the Balkans this could not have come about as a surprise, regardless at the time the statements that OHR was coming to its end were unequivocal.

In a recent interview given to a Sarajevo daily Schwarz-Schilling reveals about the only thing he did in his year in the "Office" was to campaign for it to not close. He names Madeleine Albright and Richard Holbrooke as the two people who aided him in this crusade of his the most. He goes on to state that had he not been successful the consequences would have been "catastrophic". According to Schwarz-Schilling Republic of Srpska would have been independent by now and it would have been a question of what type of new conflict would arise given the reaction of Croats and Muslims.

Office of the High Representative has always been West European depository of distinctly second-rate bureaucrats and politicians. But even in this miserable bunch Schwarz-Schilling stood out as particularly worthless. Whereas his successor Miroslav Lajčak succeeded in using his tenure to help himself catapult into the position of foreign minister of Slovakia, the looser Schwarz-Schilling has to satisfy with a fantasy where his underwhelming keep-the-OHR-alive campaign averted a war.

There in a nutshell you have the reason why intervention in the Balkans made sense for the West. Aside from being an opportunity for individual advancement, it presented endless opportunity for self-congratulation. After the West collectively congratulated itself for ending non-existent death camps, a non-existent genocide and for just in general working on straightening out the savages in the Balkans and their mess, why wouldn't the dweeb Schwarz-Schilling congratulate himself for averting a non-existent danger of war in 2007?

As for the issue of the closure of the OHR, Schwarz-Schilling's victory was empty. The "High Representative" is far from the position of absolutist power it was in the days of Paddy Ashdown's and Wolfgang Petrisch's frenzied power trips. On paper the "High Representative" has all the powers it had in their day, but in reality is constrained from exercising many of them. The "office" continues to exist but is becoming less and less relevant.

Unfortunately the main reason why this is so is that Brussels, and more and more Berlin, are becoming involved in Bosnia and Herzegovina directly. This sort of tutorship is potentially even worse than the exercise of power through the so called High Representative since being more stealthy it can endure far longer.

Wonderful

2011-03-12T10:17:00.003+01:00

Antiwar.com ran an opinion piece written by me that was sparked by the return of the rhetoric of humanitarian intervention in regard to the situation in Libya. Here to read it.

Those Pesky "Narrow Ethnic Agendas"

2011-03-09T16:51:00.006+01:00

This week the State Department issued a statement through its official spokesman Philip J. Crowley and the Sarajevo embassy in regard to the political situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina. As usually Washington is "deeply concerned" and full of prescriptions.

For the sake of feigned balance the statement calls on the political parties of the Bosnian-Herzegovian Muslims to postpone their announced decision to constitute the House of Peoples of the Federation, noting that doing so without the Croatian delegates present would "raise serious legal concerns". Actually a constituent session without a plenum would be blatantly illegal.

More importantly and more sincerely it throws its weight behind the "High Representative" and his "initiative to mediate". The most significant actions of the viceroy so far have been to apply pressure against the main Croatian parties right down to off the record threats of sanctions, and to confirm an interim budget (yes he can do that), thus removing the teeth of Croatian obstruction.

By law a budget has to be confirmed by the House of Peoples. The obstruction of the House of Peoples by the Croat parties should thus have prevented the budget for 2011 being confirmed and defunded all entity-level state institutions. Aside from delighting the libertarians the world over this would instil great urgency in the attempts of the political parties to negotiate a settlement, making a speedy conclusion of the crisis and the meeting of Croatian demands not unlikely.

The key, and the harshest part of the communique is addressed to the Croatian parties. They are called upon to "begin cooperating immediately" as they are deemed "in violation of the Federation Constitution". And:

"By failing to uphold this obligation, they are putting a narrow ethnic agenda before the interests of all the citizens of the Federation and Bosnia and Herzegovina."

Translation: Get in line!

Croatia Protesters to Government: Shove Your EU

2011-03-09T10:40:00.006+01:00

When the Arab World protests got into gear, probably in every country in the world there were people posing a challenge to their surroundings - they are doing this, why not we? And in most places it stayed at that. However, in Croatia for one it sparked a small protest movement.

Naturally the protests in Croatia are much different from the ones in Cairo, Tripoli, etc. For one they are much smaller. In a country of 4 million there has jet to be a protest that would break the 10,000 mark. Secondly, their nature is much different. The government of Croatia is deeply unpopular, but it is also democratically elected. The calls of the protesters are not for the forceful overthrow of the government, but for the cabinet to recognise it is incompetent and do the right thing and resign.

So in themselves the protests are not greatly remarkable. What is more remarkable and telling is that unlike virtually anyone else the Croats let themselves be nudged into action by the example of the protests in the Arab World. This is a symptom of the state Croatia finds itself in and the outlook of its populace for their future.

Croatians have to contend with a considerable level of unemployment, high costs of living, moderate doses of poorly concealed corruption and no real growth. This, coupled with some natural propensity for melancholia and long standing acquired pessimism regarding any monetary matters, means they are deeply cynical about the government and the prospects of government, any government, turning things around. Ironically, the same sentiment that brought a small minority out on the streets, is what is keeping many more people off it.

Taking into account that by some polls the prime minister enjoys a 13.7% approval rating and over 70% of the people support the protesters, the size of the protests is very small. For example yesterday in one of the most successful demonstrations a mere 8,000 people marched through a section of the capital city, Zagreb. Though even this may convey the wrong picture of what actually took place. The two hour long "march" could just as easily be described as an evening stroll.

For the most part the deeply cynical Croats simply can not be bothered with demonstrations. No matter how unhappy they are, they do not see things improving no matter what happens with the government.

As for the people marching, the endearing thing about them is their anti-EU stance. Among the standard leftist fare a sentiment prominently expressed on their placards is opposition to Croatia joining the European Union. On the most important issue for the country's future they could not be more right. Perhaps that is a small cause for optimism right there.

When in Doubt: Empty the Wallet

2011-03-03T10:37:00.003+01:00

Quoting Hillary Clinton at a US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations meeting:

"During the Cold War we did a great job in getting America’s message out. After the Berlin Wall fell we said, ‘Okay, fine, enough of that, we are done,’ and unfortunately we are paying a big price for it. And our private media cannot fill that gap. ... We are in an information war and we are losing that war, I'll be very blunt in my assessment. Al Jazeera is winning. The Chinese have opened up a global English language and multi-language television network, the Russians have opened up an English language network. I've seen it in a couple of countries and it's quite instructive. We are cutting back. The BBC is cutting back."

"So here is what we are trying to do. In the State Department we have pushed very hard on new media. So we have an Arabic twitter feed. We have a Farsi twitter feed. I have this group of young techno experts who are out there engaging on websites. And we are putting all of our young Arabic speaking diplomats out so they are talking about our values. Walter is working hard with his board to try to transform the broadcasting efforts, because most people still get their news from TV and radio. So even though we are pushing online we can't forget TV and radio. I would look very much toward your cooperation to try to figure out how we get back in the game on this because I hate ceding what we are most expert in to anybody else."

It is hardly surprising Clinton sees news reporting as a kind of war. Not even between America and its rivals (Qatar is hardly such), but between the kind of reporting official Washington welcomes, and the kind it does not.

Trouble is Al Jazeera's and RT's successful encroachment on a field previously monopolized by American corporate news channels is not down to funding. Al Jazeera and RT are simply more truthful and more relevant. Western English language TV news programmes do not lack the financial means to compete with Al Jazeera, RT or CCTV. If they are finding themselves outmatched, as Clinton suggests, it is because their coverage is to a large degree made up of distortions and distractions - just like the State Department likes it.

RT and Al Jazeera English are not without fault. Al Jazeera's coverage of the Balkans is no better than that of CNN, and RT is not without its cringe worthy moments. However they can be switched on without the certainty the time spent viewing will be a waste of time.

The idea Clinton can address a weakness that is the lack of truthfulness by throwing money at it and turning up the volume of low-quality information complete with "young techno experts" spamming websites is fanciful.

You Are Not Belgium!

2011-02-24T03:29:00.006+01:00

Mrs. Pack is in the news again. Visiting Bosnia and Herzegovina as the head of a European Parliamentary delegation she scolded the Bosnian-Herzegovian politicians for not jet having formed a government coalition. Her choice of words was rather peculiar, and revealing. She stated:

"You are not Belgium and you cannot afford that luxury."

Or in other words Mrs. Pack as a cultivated German lady, a bearer of superior European manners, came to the semi-savage land of Bosnia, to straighten it up. She came then, not as a guest or a simple passer-by, but as a figure of authority, a bona fide empress. Her mastery over this pitiful land no less the matter of her allegiance to the civilised portion of the continent, as the matter of her official function. And the first thing on her mind was to remind the natives of their station.

A more honest phrasing of the warning would be: Do not dare compare yourself to Belgium - they are Westerners. You must listen to us and do as we say (not as we do).

Parallel Universe

2011-02-20T01:07:00.007+01:00

Just after the worst ever year for the occupation in Afghanistan in which by its own data the number of attacks rose by over 50% it is possible to read in the press:

"General Petraeus’s success in bringing security to much of southern Afghanistan has defied gloomy forecasts from critics — including many in Mr Obama’s inner circle — who insisted that the Iraq surge could not be repeated in such a different setting."

Note the outrageous lie within the outrageous lie. Actually "the critics" never fell for the idiotic "the surge worked" spin and fully expected the Afghan effort to replicate the non-existent results of the Iraq surge.

Seeing that more and more the Empire is content with imaginary newspaper victories in place of the real thing I propose that henceforth it conducts imaginary invasions and imaginary occupations, directing imaginary divisions and imaginary Predator drones to be reported on by the pliant press as if they were real. That way the imperialists can have their "successes" and the rest of us can get on with our lives, secure in the knowledge that self-delusion in Washington is not costing the lives of innocents the world over.

Russia Police Purge

2011-02-15T23:13:00.001+01:00

As part of its police reform Russia is to fire 20% of its policemen. Welcome news. Knowing a little about how bureaucracies work I would not be surprised if they booted the least bad 20% of the militsioneri, but it is still a step in the right direction.

Too bad it is too be paired with an increase in salaries for the remaining cops. The rationale behind such moves is always the same - the buerocrats' jobs become more valuable to them making them less likely to risk them by accepting bribes, thus cutting down on corruption.

In reality what this does is make the bribes too expensive for poor people to afford, making it impossible for them to deflect the worst of a state assault on their wallet, or person, with a strategically placed banknote.

For a more detailed look at the reform and its other aspects, many of them positive, check out an entry at Russia: Other Points of View.

Chuck Brilliance

2011-02-14T22:17:00.013+01:00

In last week's episode of Chuck a villain – who not unusual for Chuck universe is a voluptuous, exotic woman – succeeds in coming up with a way to produce flawless copies of one hundred dollar bills. Later on it is revealed her villainous plan is to crash the US dollar by placing into circulation one trillion worth of these notes.

The funniest part of the episode comes half way into the show at a villains' meeting where the lesser villains that had provided the funds – one hundred million in gold – for the money-printing operation demand a status report. The chief villain reveals she has printed up "more notes than originally anticipated, for a grand total of one trillion US dollars", after which the financiers go ballistic exclaiming that that is too much currency, after all their fortunes depend on a strong dollar!

The chief villain – and the proud owner of one hundred million in gold – smiles, noting that her fortune on the other hand does not rely on the strength of a dollar. After which she naturally signals to members of her all-female private army and they gun down the lesser villains.

There you go, even TV villains are aware of dangers of excessive money creation and the advantages of owning gold. Now, if only the job of real spooks was to combat inflation.

Byzantinism in the Protectorate

2011-02-12T16:42:00.004+01:00

In regard to my last post an attentive reader may come to wonder, how is it possible that five Croat representatives in the House of Peoples come from Bosnian Muslim parties as do majority of the Serbs? Would this not have to mean these parties are actually multi-national and can claim to speak for a part of Croatian and Serbian people in Bosnia and Herzegovina? No, thanks to the convoluted ways in which the political system in the country works this is not the case at all.

The delegates to the House of Peoples are elected by cantonal assemblies. Each canton of the Federation elects a predetermined number of Croat, Serb and 'Bosniak' representatives according to its national structure as per the 1991 census. However as Croats (and Serbs) are small minorities in many of the cantons, they have little influence in the cantonal legislatures and therefore do not play a role in election of ostensibly 'their' representatives to the House of Peoples. Delegates from such cantons owe their position not to the few Croat (Serb) voters, but to the Muslim parties that dominate the cantonal legislatures that instal them. Once they take place in the House they vote accordingly.

Initially the role of the House of Peoples of the Federation was to reassure the less numerous Croats that in a union with the Bosnian-Herzegovian Muslims they would have the means to prevent the possibility of being dominated by their partners as per the democratic principle of the rule of the more numerous. As their voice in the chamber would be no less than that of the Muslims, and the chamber would need to confirm the budget, new laws and the government they would have the means to block motions that would be harmful for them and which they could not counter in the House of Representatives of the Federation.

However since then the House of Peoples had been gutted. In 2001 the foreigners' colonial overlord Wolfgang Petrisch involved himself in a virtual tug of war with the Bosnian-Herzegovian Croats eventualy going so far as to remove the Croatian member of the presidency and ban him from public life. (The equivalent Koffi Annan overriding US elections and booting George Bush from the position of the president of the USA.) The next year he rewrote the constitution, introducing changes affecting the House of Peoples. The number of decisions requiring the confirmation of the chamber was lessened, the requirements for a House of Peoples veto were raised and the proportion of Croat delegates from the cantons where there are few Croats increased.

Previously while the Croats and the Muslims were both guaranteed 30 seats in the House of Peoples, the number of Serb seats was dependant on their showing in the elections for cantonal assemblies. Petrisch guaranteed the Serbs an equal number of seats, but did it without actually increasing their influence in the chamber. Owing to their being a clear numerical minority in all of the cantons of the Federation their influence in the bodies that elect the delegates to the House of Peoples is insufficient to ensure their actual representatives take the seats supposedly reserved for them. Essentially what happens is that Muslim and to a lesser extent Croat parties determine who is to "represent" the Serbs in the Federation. The only rule they must adhere to is that the person in question is someone who declares his nationality as Serbian. To add grotesque to the absurd the number of Serb delegates that each canton elects is determined as per the 1991 population census – although the effects of wartime expulsions were never fully reversed and ethnic demography is much changed since then. This means that the greatest number of Serb representatives frequently come not from the areas where the few Federation Serbs actually live in, but from the areas from which the greatest number of Serbs have been driven away from. In the previous composition of the House of Peoples less than a third of Serb representatives were from the parties that Serbs vote for and for whom could therefore be said were elected by and represent Serbian voters.

The introduction of seats reserved for Serb delegates was purely cosmetic. However to accommodate the Serb seats the size of the chamber was not correspondingly increased, instead the number of seats reserved for Croats and Muslims was lowered from 30 to 17. This coupled with the principle that every canton where there live any Croats at all elect at least one Croat representative had the effect of increasing the proportion of Croat representatives from the cantons where Croats have no influence in the cantonal assemblies. Previously the four or five delegates from the Muslim parties taking up Croat seats regularly inserted into the House of Peoples were of little consequence. With the constitution of the Federation requiring a 50% support of delegates from the Croatian people for a measure to pass, the Croats only needed to garner a majority of 60-65% of representatives elected by the Croat voters to satisfy the 16 out of 30 treshold. However with the number of their seats reduced to seventeen and the Petrisch's constitutional amendments of 2002 requiring a two-thirds supermajority for the vetoing of a measure in the chamber, they now have to show an extraordinary amount of unanimity in order to prevent a measure from passing. Obviously with just 12 or 13 of the 17 representatives beholden to the parties the Croats vote for, the 12 out of 17 threshold de facto represents a Croat supermajority of 90 to 100%. With four of five seats that count as Croatian in their pocket by default, the large Muslim parties need only drive a small wedge between the actual representatives of the Croats to have their measures pass.

It is clear such a House of Peoples serves little function. In regard to the Serbs it provides for no more than decor. It increases their visibility in the Federation providing appearance of ethnic variance and the hallowed "multi-culturalism" even as it does nothing to amplify their voices. In regard to the Croats it only barely increases their political weight, making it questionable if it is sufficient to enable them to avert the danger of effective disenfranchisement.

It should not come as a surprise then the strategy of the Croat parties since the elections in October has been obstruction. If they can prevent the House of Peoples from being constituted at all, they can block measures that require its confirmation this way. Predictably the current colonial overlord, Valentin Inzko, has responded by exerting pressure to cease and to threaten sanctions. This reaction is predictable, but it is not balanced. The obstruction of the Croat parties comes as a response to the plans of the SDP (and SDA) to form a government of the Federation virtually without including Croat parties even though the original settlement envisages power sharing, specifically assigning five of the thirteen ministerial positions in the government to be staffed by Croats. A requirement the SDP is planning to fulfil by installing to them its own professional Croats – something it would not be possible for it to do in the first place if the House of Peoples had not been gutted by Inzko's predecessor, Wolfgang Petrisch.

The picture here drawn paints politics in Bosnia and Herzegovina as complex and as obsessing over individual's nationality ("ethnicity" as per Western parlance) however in this case it is very much the case the convoluted political process including the nationality requirements for the functionaries are the creations of foreigners. The system in place in Bosnia is not the result of internal negotiations, but had been forced on it from the outside, either at Dayton or later through the "Office of the High Representative".

The insistence of the non-dominant nationalities has never been on ethnic quotas, but on influence through their legitimate representatives. There is any number of ways this could be achieved while simultaneously freeing the political process from the clutter of purely ethnic quotas. However the present system which reduces this problematic to a matter of affirmative action for a small number of individuals of the right nationality are preferable to those with power for its ability to produce the superficial illusion of a multi-ethnic cooperative where people of all nationalities are content, without actually having to make concessions to the two non-dominant nationalities to de-antagonise them by allowing for actual pluralism. The underhand, byzantine way in which the House of Peoples was gutted and the Croats in the Federation left open to be subject to majority rule of the Muslims is a great example of this masking strategy in action.

Protectorate Update

2011-01-25T10:59:00.006+01:00

Having blogged as much about Bosnia and Herzegovina as I have I reckon I owe an update on what is happening in the country in regard to the events I had previously mentioned.

The government of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina has not been formed jet. The SDP-SDA coalition with its minor Croat satellites has been agreed on long ago, however any Federation government needs to be confirmed by the House of Peoples of the Federation, which has not jet held its inaugural session.

The House of Peoples is the normally less visible chamber of the bicameral Federal parliament where an equal number of seats are reserved for Croats, 'Bosniaks' and Serbs. It has not jet been constituted since complications in one of the electoral units have meant the final composition of the House of Peoples is not jet known.

So far it seems the SDP-SDA coalition will have just enough votes in the House of Peoples that would enable it to be confirmed the government of the Federation. To pass such a vote a coalition needs to secure six votes from the seventeen representatives of each of the three nationalities. The nominally Serb representatives in the House of Peoples are under majority control of the Muslim parties so the outcome there is not in question. Among the Croat representatives the coalition controls five Croatian seats. One is in the hand of NSRZB, a minor Croatian party, and four in the hands of SDP. The wild card is the Croatian seat held by DNZ, a small party associated with the famous Bosnian Muslim politican Fikret Abdić.

However the two Croat parties with non-marginal support among the Bosnian Croat voting body, are vowing to obstruct the work of the House of Peoples by not taking their seats in the chamber. Therefore regardless of the mathematical feasibility, it is doubtful the actual formation of the government will be anywhere as straightforward as that.

The Hag Attack

2011-01-24T19:17:00.015+01:00

Catherine Ashton, EU apparatchik with the important sounding post of the "High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy" can not get enough of Bosnia. A year ago she boldly declared it a priority for the EU for the year 2010. Having predictably accomplished none of what she had set out to do, she has now let it be known the EU is considering taking measures that would "accelerate the country's path to the EU" (an euphemism for enacting centralisation).

Among the measures being considered are curtailment of financial aid for Bosnia and Herzegovina and travel bans and the freezing of financial assets for those of its politicians for whom it will be determined are "intentionally blocking the countries progression to the EU".

Certainly it is wonderful to know the EU has such a great comprehension of the concept of private property. Seizing the property of politicians you do not like! What a wonderful enhancement of the democratic process. It must be that it is ingenuity like this that is the mark of superior level of political culture in Brussels that legitimises its tutelage over Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The criteria for deciding against which elected representatives sanctions would be imposed is no less interesting. Blocking the path to the EU is grounds for confiscation of property? Who knew EU membership was not optional and voluntary, but a must. Travel bans are just as entertaining. I guess, should BiH eventually join the EU the Bosnian politicians with those will just have to be driven out of their homes.

When the scheme was brought to the attention of Doris Pack officially the "European Parliament’s rapporteur on Bosnia and Herzegovina", unofficially the other Brussels hag with a Bosnia obsession, she stated she did not know if the proposal was out there, but to no ones surprise whatsoever, added that if there was she had no objections. She was quoted as saying:

"That is one of the instruments. We do not have many others. We can demand, talk, pass resolutions, but that is not stimulative enough for them. I do not know if there is truth to the initiative of introduction of sanctions, but if there is, I have nothing against it. The politicians [in Bosnia] have to finally realise what they were elected for."

Why Doris, we thought politicians were elected to represent the people who elected them?

Locally, SDP reacted by stating they had "absolutely nothing against" such measures and "could not see who could have anything against them". Brussels' favorite sons are obviously not worried any of the sanctions would befell them.

On the other hand the Brussel's least favourite son, Milorad Dodik of the SNSD, did not let himself be fazed, but nonchalantly poured cold rain over the whole thing, noting the international community had tried as much in the period when it had far larger military presence on the ground, immense funding and power through the high representative jet failed to model BiH the way it wanted to regardless.

Indeed, coercive measures such as baroness Catherine Ashton would resort to in the face of her failure would actually be mild in comparison to the berserk methods that were employed in the reign of Wolfgang Petrisch and Paddy Ashdown. Petrisch in 2001 banned from public life the whole upper garniture of the largest party of Bosnian Croats, HDZ BiH, and unseated them from the posts they had been elected to. He actually dismissed the country's Croat member of the presidency from that body. Regardless of such strong-arming frenzies in the past the EU today insists BiH is a failure.

It will remain a failure as long as the extent of the deliberations in Brussels is wether to use coercive methods for establishing of a centralised model of Bosnia, instead of centring around the question if a highly centralised state is actually desirable. Or, what is preferable, over the question if Brussels' has any business meddling in Bosnia and Herzegovina to begin with.